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ABSTRACT 
INTUITION IN EMPLOYEE SELECTION: EXAMINING THE CONDITIONS FOR 
ACCURATE INTUITIVE HIRING DECISIONS 
by 
Vinod U. Vincent 
In complex organizational environments, managers often rely on intuition to make 
decisions. Research has found intuition to be helpful when the task is complex; the 
decision maker is a domain expert; and when the decision environment has a high level 
of uncertainty, complexity, time pressure, insufficient data, and more than one reasonable 
solution. However, in employee selection, which is a decision environment that typically 
has the aforementioned characteristics that are conducive for intuition, scholars discount 
the usefulness of intuition in favor of more objective, analytical selection methods such 
as specific aptitude (e.g. sales ability) tests. A reason for the lack of academic support for 
intuitive hiring is that research in employee selection has not thoroughly examined 
contextual factors that impact an interviewer’s ability to make an accurate intuitive hiring 
decision (i.e., one that results in selecting the best candidate out of multiple viable 
options). The purpose of this study was to explore such factors. More specifically, this 
study examined the impact of interviewer expertise, cognitive style, and procedural 
accountability on the accuracy of intuitive hiring decisions when recruiting for complex 
jobs. The hypotheses were tested via a two-part experimental study that used expert (N = 
79) and non-expert (N = 83) interviewer samples. The results demonstrate that, when 
recruiting for complex jobs, interviewer expertise does increase the accuracy of intuitive 
vii 
 
hiring decisions. The findings underscore the importance of domain expertise in intuitive 
decision-making and have a number of theoretical and practical implications to employee 
selection and the broader field of organizational decision-making.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Effective decision-making is critical to the success of an organization. Yet, a 
dilemma faced by many managers is how to make effective decisions in complex, 
ambiguous, and time-constrained environments as is typically found in organizational 
settings today. In such environments, there is often an excessive amount of data. In 
addition, due to the novelty and ambiguity of many business problems, there is seldom a 
proven rational model to derive the best decision (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). 
Therefore, and given the overwhelming amount of available information and the limited 
capacity of the human brain to process that information (Simon, 1992), managers tend to 
rely on their intuition when making a decision (e.g. Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999; 
Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).  
Individuals have two distinct cognitive systems for processing information and 
making decisions; namely, intuition and analysis (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Intuition is 
an emotionally charged, nonconscious, automatic, and rapid cognitive process (Dane & 
Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2010; Hammond, 2010). Analysis, on the other hand, is conscious, 
rational, logical, and is a comparatively slower cognitive process than intuition (Epstein, 
1994; Epstein, 2010; Hammond, 2010). Of the two systems, intuition is thought to result 
in better decisions in environments where there is greater uncertainty, complexity, time 
pressure, insufficient data, and multiple solution possibilities (Agor, 1986; Baldacchino, 
Ucbasaran, Cabantous, & Lockett, 2015; Burke & Miller, 1999). 
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One environment that would seem to fit the aforementioned set of characteristics 
is employee selection.  However, research in this area often discourages the use of 
intuition (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Kausel, Culbertson, & Madrid, 
2016), with scholars pointing to the biases of the intuitive process (e.g., the tendency to 
gravitate towards candidates who are similar to oneself). For this reason, these scholars 
argue that objective forms of assessment, such as cognitive ability tests, provide a more 
accurate evaluation of a candidate.  
It is somewhat surprising that intuition is labeled ineffective for hiring decisions 
given its usefulness in decision-making environments that are similar to employee 
selection (i.e., environments that have a high-level of uncertainty, complexity, time 
pressure, insufficient data, and multiple solution possibilities). The current study argues 
that one reason for this lack of academic support likely rests in the relatively scarce 
number of empirical studies that have examined the role of intuition in recruitment (Miles 
& Sadler-Smith, 2014). As a result, research has yet to thoroughly consider contextual 
factors that impact an interviewer’s ability to make an accurate intuitive hiring decision. 
Stated differently, a negative attitude towards intuitive hiring has been generalized to the 
field at large without a thorough evaluation of the conditions in which intuition may, in 
fact, be helpful. Therefore, the purpose of this paper was to explore the conditions that 
impact the accuracy of an intuitive hiring decision. Accuracy, as defined in this paper, is 
the ability of the interviewer to select the best candidate out of multiple viable options. 
Relatedly, the research questions of interest in this paper are these: Can intuition lead to 
accurate hiring decisions; and if so, under what conditions is this more likely to occur?  
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One such condition assumed to be of importance in the current study is job 
complexity. Accordingly, a complex job is a position that has many tacit elements that 
leads to successful job performance (Campbell, 1984). Research has found objective and 
analytical methods, such as cognitive ability tests and highly structured employment 
interviews, to be effective when recruiting for low complexity jobs (e.g., Conway, Jako, 
& Goodman, 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988). However, as 
job complexity increase, research finds that the effectiveness of analytical hiring methods 
to decrease (Huffcutt, Weekley, Wiesner, Groot, & Jones, 2001; Levashina, Hartwell, 
Morgeson, & Campion, 2014).  As a consequence, intuition may be the more effective 
way to make hiring decisions for complex jobs. In fact, considering that intuition has 
been found to be more effective than analysis for complex tasks such as identifying 
counterfeit products or a place to live (e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004), this 
paper argued that intuition is more accurate than analytical cognitive processing when 
hiring for complex jobs. 
Interviewer expertise (i.e., prior experience recruiting for similar positions) may 
also impact the accuracy of an intuitive hiring decision. Prior research indicates that a 
decision maker’s expertise increases the accuracy of intuitive decisions for complex tasks 
such as those noted earlier as well as evaluating artwork or forecasting road safety (e.g., 
Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra, Pligt, & Kleef, 2013; Hammond, 
Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). In comparison, there is evidence that expertise does 
not increase the accuracy of analytical decisions for those types of complex tasks (Dane 
et al., 2012). Therefore, since expertise has a positive impact on intuition and not on 
analysis, it is expected that when expert interviewers use intuition, they will be more 
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accurate than when they use analysis. Furthermore, compared to non-expert interviewers 
(i.e., those who does not have prior recruiting experience), this paper predicted that 
expert interviewers will make more accurate hiring decisions.  
In addition to job complexity and interviewer expertise, another important factor 
that may affect the accuracy of intuition is the interviewer’s cognitive style. Cognitive 
style refers to an individual’s inherent tendency to use either an analytical or an intuitive 
style of information processing and decision-making (Brigham, De Castro, & Shepherd, 
2007). In employee selection, cognitive style of interviewers has been found to impact 
the preference for intuitive or analytical hiring methods (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). 
Moreover, a mismatch between an individual’s cognitive style and the actual decision-
making approach used to solve a problem is argued to have a detrimental effect 
(Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Drawing from this research and other studies discussed in 
the literature review, the current study expected that interviewers whose cognitive style 
match the employee selection method (i.e., intuitive versus analytical) will be more 
accurate than those whose cognitive style does not match the employee selection method. 
Another shortcoming of existing intuition research is that it tends to focus on 
conditions that are conducive to intuitive decision-making, with no attention and limited 
understanding of common organizational factors that could disrupt an expert’s ability to 
make an accurate intuitive decision.  One such factor is procedural accountability. 
Procedural accountability is the extent to which an individual is held accountable for the 
procedure used in making a decision (Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 
1996). Thus, the next research question this paper explores is: how does procedural 
accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s intuitive judgment?   
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Based on the extant research on accountability, when individuals are required to 
account for their decisions, research suggests that they are then inclined to use a more 
deliberate cognitive information processing strategy (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 
1983). Research has, in fact, found support for a relationship between procedural 
accountability and analytical thinking (e.g., Doney & Armstrong, 1996). Analytical 
thinking, in turn, may disrupt the intuitive process (Baumeister, 1984; Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991). This disruption of the intuitive process can negatively affect decision 
quality when the decision maker is an expert (e.g., Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr, 
2004; Beilock, Carr, McMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Gray, 2004; Melcher & Schooler, 
2004; Wimmers, Schmidt, Verkoeijen, & Van De Wiel, 2005). Therefore, when 
recruiting for complex jobs, the current study predicted that the accuracy of expert 
interviewers’ intuitive decisions will be lower when they are held accountable for the 
hiring procedure.    
 In summary, this paper assessed the impact of interviewer expertise, cognitive 
style, and procedural accountability on the accuracy of intuitive hiring decisions when 
recruiting for complex jobs. This assessment occurred via a two-part experimental study 
that assigned participants to intuition, analysis, and procedural accountability conditions. 
Participants included an expert and non-expert sample of interviewers. In each part of the 
study, participants performed the task of employee selection for a complex job. 
Participants assumed the role of an interviewer, reviewed recordings of 10 pairs of 
candidate interviews, and for each pair, decided which one of the two candidate 
responses was better. The accuracy of hiring decisions was measured by calculating the 
number of times the participants’ selected the best candidate response.  
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This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, by identifying 
conditions in which intuition can lead to accurate hiring decisions, the paper challenges 
the existing notion among scholars that intuition is always less accurate than decisions 
derived through more objective methods such as cognitive ability tests (e.g., Highhouse, 
2008b; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013). As proposed by Evans (2010), we need to identify 
when it is appropriate to rely on intuition and when it is not.  Second, by testing whether 
the findings of human cognitive processing (i.e., that intuition can be effective when the 
decision maker has domain expertise and when the task is complex) holds true in an 
employee selection context, this study extends the research on intuition. Third, since we 
have a limited understanding of factors that could disrupt expert intuition in an 
organizational setting, by empirically investigating the impact of procedural 
accountability on expert intuition, this study attempted to narrow that gap while, at the 
same time, advancing our knowledge of the role of accountability.   
From a practitioner perspective, it will be extremely helpful to identify the 
circumstances in which an expert interviewer should be allowed some leeway to use their 
intuitive judgment in employee selection. This would be especially important for 
complex jobs as these positions may have a significant influence on firm performance. 
Therefore, the study makes a contribution to employee selection by enabling practitioners 
to identify conditions in which it may be acceptable to allow an interviewer to use their 
expert intuition over and above analytical selection methods. 
Finally, by empirically examining the role of intuition in employee selection, this 
study expands our knowledge of when intuition can be useful in a real-world, 
organizational decision-making environment. The study underscores the importance of 
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contextual factors in determining the effectiveness of intuition in managerial decision-
making. By doing so, it lays the foundation for future research to further explore such 
organizational factors that may impact intuition.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Intuition 
Intuition is an emotionally charged, nonconscious, automatic, and rapid cognitive 
process (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2010; Hammond 2010). The concept of intuition 
has intrigued management and psychology scholars for decades. Chester Barnard (1938), 
one of the first management scholars to emphasize the role of intuition in managerial 
decision-making, identified intuition as a rapid, non-logical, and complex decision-
making process. Intuition occurs outside of consciousness and therefore, cannot be 
expressed using words (Barnard, 1938) or understood through conscious evaluation 
(Jung, 1921). Intuition is particularly useful when a solution is seemingly impossible 
through logical reasoning. In such a situation, intuition unconsciously and automatically 
works towards finding a resolution (Jung, 1921). 
Expanding on the role of intuition in decision-making, Herbert Simon (1957) 
concluded that due to the overwhelming amount of available information in real-world 
situations and the limited capacity of the human brain to process that information, 
individuals tend to rely on intuition.  He called this phenomenon bounded rationality. The 
underlying assumption of bounded rationality is that because of information processing 
deficiencies of the mind, there are limits on the ability of human beings to make optimal, 
or even satisfactory, decisions in complex environments (Simon, 1992). 
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Heuristics-and-Biases versus Naturalistic Decision-making 
Based on Simon’s (1957) argument, intuition is a default method to make 
decisions in complex decision-making environments. What Simon did not elaborate on, 
however, was the effectiveness of this form of decision-making. Insights into this topic 
can be found in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973; 1983) seminal work on heuristics and 
biases, which portrays intuition as flawed since intuitive judgments violate the statistical 
rules of prediction. Heuristics-and-biases are the decision rules, mental mechanisms, and 
subjective opinions used by individuals when making decisions (Busenitz & Barney, 
1997). Based on their influential research, the causes for the deficiencies of intuition are 
now attributed to one of three forms of heuristics: (1) representativeness – similarities 
with prior situations; (2) availability –what comes easily to mind; and (3) anchoring –
what comes to mind first (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012).    
Diverging from the heuristics-and-biases view and offering a more positive view 
of intuition, the naturalistic-decision-making-framework emerged in the late 1980s 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). The naturalistic-decision-making view 
highlights the usefulness of intuition by focusing on the role of expert intuition (Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Klein, Calderwood, & Macgregor, 1989; Klein, 
1993). According to this view, in complex real-world settings (see Table 1 for 
characteristics), analytical techniques are not always feasible or effective. For instance, it 
is difficult to account for ambiguity, uncertainty, and missing data when applying 
analytical methods (Klein & Klinger, 1991). In these types of settings, due to extensive 
experience in the decision-making domain, an expert is instead able to quickly recognize 
the correct course of action without much deliberation (Klein et al., 1988). 
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Advocates of the heuristics-and-biases approach accept the existence of skill and 
experience but focus on the errors of intuitive judgment (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
Heuristics-and-biases researchers believe that the source of intuition is merely heuristic 
[i.e., use of cognitive shortcuts without effort or analytical reasoning (Epstein, 2010)] and 
does not draw from skill or experience (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). In contrast, 
proponents of the naturalistic-decision-making view understand that individuals make 
mistakes but focus on the extraordinary outcomes attained through the successful 
intuitive decisions made by experts. Both groups agree that intuitive judgments originate 
in the unconscious and are automatic and effortless. However, the naturalistic-decision-
making researchers believe that effective intuitive judgments are derived from an 
individual’s skill and experience in the decision-making domain.  
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Intuition versus Guessing, Instinct, and Insight 
 A significant shortcoming of the earlier research on intuition is the lack of a clear 
definition of what intuition is (Dane & Pratt, 2007). More recently, scholars have 
attempted to clarify intuition by differentiating it from similar constructs such as 
guessing, instinct, and insight. The only similarity between intuition and guessing is its 
speed. Other than speed, guessing is vastly different from intuition, as it does not involve 
the nonconscious utilization of complex mental models. In addition, guessing lacks the 
inherent conviction that is evident in an intuitive decision (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  Instincts 
refer to innate reflex actions that are biologically instigated rather than derived through 
nonconscious cognitive information processing (e.g., Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, 
Claxton, & Sparrow, 2009). In contrast, insights are an unexpected solution to a problem 
that springs to mind typically after a lengthy incubation period (Hodgkinson et al., 
2009a). Therefore, unlike intuition, which is a rapid and nonconscious process, insights 
typically follow deliberate, analytical thinking (Dane & Pratt, 2007). In fact, intuition can 
precede insight by way of a feeling of knowing that guides the individual towards the 
ultimate decision (Hodgkinson et al., 2009a).   
Types of Intuition 
Scholars have also attempted to identify different facets of intuition (e.g., Dane & 
Pratt, 2009; Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). The prevalent types include: (1) 
expert intuition (Baylor, 2001) (2) social intuition (Ambady, 2010), (3) moral intuition 
(Sonenshein, 2007), and (4) creative intuition (Eling, Griffin, & Langerak, 2014). Expert 
intuition refers to an intuitive decision based on an individual’s expertise in that 
particular domain. This type is also called “problem-solving intuition” or “intuitive 
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expertise” (Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015).  The premise of expert intuition is that 
individuals who have a tremendous amount of expertise in a specific domain, given a 
problem within the same domain, are able to automatically identify complex patterns and 
provide quick, effortless, and accurate responses.  However, expert intuition is domain 
specific. An expert in one domain may not be able to make an accurate intuitive decision 
in a vastly different domain (Dane & Pratt, 2007).    
Social intuition, also referred to as “mind-reading”, enables individuals to quickly 
and automatically evaluate and identify another person’s motivations and intentions. This 
is done through the nonconscious processing of verbal and non-verbal cues. Social 
intuitions are judgments and may not necessarily be accurate. In addition, social intuition 
can be significantly influenced by individual factors such as fears, biases, prejudices, and 
wishful thinking (Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). Social intuition is particularly 
relevant to situations that involve interpersonal interactions such as employee selection 
(Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). 
Moral intuition is a fast, non-deliberate, and emotionally charged cognitive 
process (Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014) that is associated with how individuals react 
to ethical dilemmas. Individuals make moral decisions intuitively (i.e., quickly and 
automatically) and then search for evidence to rationalize their initial reaction 
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). Finally, creative intuition is a 
non-rational process and involves the synthesizing of disparate elements to form a novel 
creation (Dane & Pratt, 2009). Individuals may be able to improve creativity through the 
re-creation of those environments where they have experienced intuition (Burke & 
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Miller, 1999). Furthermore, intuition always precedes creativity, invention, and 
innovation (Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015). 
Intuition is a “Fuzzy Construct” 
As discussed in the foregoing section, research from management and psychology 
is not short of attempts to explain what intuition is and how it impacts the human 
decision-making process. In fact, more recently the study of intuition has gained 
considerable interest in both industry and academia. Even though the extant literature 
relating to the topic has broadened our knowledge of this phenomenon called intuition, it 
has not necessarily deepened and clarified our understanding of what intuition is, how it 
works, and how it can be used more effectively. There is still a certain amount of 
confusion surrounding the concept of intuition, which has hindered the advancement of 
the topic.  
One of the main causes for the confusion surrounding intuition is the diverse 
definitions of what intuition is (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hammond et al., 1987). As noted by 
Epstein (2010), not only do scholars disagree about what intuition is, they sometimes 
even contradict their own arguments. As a result, intuition is viewed as a fuzzy construct 
with limited scientific value as the definitions of intuition do not clearly express the 
operation of intuition (Epstein, 2010). The confusion is not because most scholars have 
completely opposing views of what intuition is. Instead, the problem is that the different 
definitions tend to focus on different aspects of intuition. Therefore, there is a fragmented 
notion about what intuition really means. 
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In spite of the diverse definitions of intuition, across the literature, four underlying 
characteristics emerge as central tenets of the intuitive process: (1) intuition operates 
beyond consciousness (i.e., it is a nonconscious process), (2) it involves making holistic 
associations, (3) it is fast, and (4) it is affectively charged (i.e., tied to emotion) (Dane & 
Pratt, 2007). The following paragraphs elaborate on each of the four characteristics and 
culminate with a definition of intuition. 
Intuition is a nonconscious process. Shapiro and Spence (1997) defined intuition 
as “a nonconscious, holistic processing mode in which judgments are made with no 
awareness of the rules of knowledge used for inference and which can feel right, despite 
one’s inability to articulate the reason” (p. 64). Unlike a rational decision-making process 
where the decision maker consciously and deliberately follows a logical pattern to derive 
a solution (Hogarth, 2002); intuition is a nonconscious and a non-logical cognitive 
process. Thus, the intuitive process “involves a sense of knowing without knowing how 
one knows” (Epstein, 2010 p. 296). The decision maker knows the decision but is unable 
to articulate how the decision was derived.  
Intuition makes holistic associations. Holistic association is a process where a 
specific situation triggers a nonconscious association of thoughts and patterns that are 
stored in an individual’s memory. This association of information is the result of past 
experiences that are held in mental maps or schemas within the individual’s brain 
(Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004). Simon (1992) eloquently captures this holistic cognitive 
process with his definition of intuition, which stated, “the situation has provided a cue: 
This cue has given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the 
information provides the answer.” (p. 155).  
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Intuition is fast. The speed of an intuitive response, a characteristic that was even 
observed by the pioneering management scholars of intuition (e.g., Barnard, 1938), is a 
facet of intuition that consistently appears in most scholarly work relating to intuition 
(e.g., Khatri & Ng, 2000; Hammond et al., 1987). For instance, Kahneman (2003) 
defined intuition as “thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without 
much reflection” (p. 697). Practitioners view this aspect of intuition as a benefit as it 
leads to quicker decisions (Burke & Miller, 1999). Most scholars agree that, compared to 
analytical decision-making, intuition is a speedy process (Dane & Pratt, 2007).   
Intuition is affectively charged. Intuition is firmly interwoven with the decision 
maker’s emotion (Burke & Miller, 1999; Shapiro & Spence, 1997). As such, emotion is a 
central component in intuitive decision-making. Unlike rational analysis, which is often 
associated with the “head”, intuition is considered to be intrinsically connected to the 
“heart” (i.e., emotion) (Dane & Pratt, 2007) which has prompted some scholars to call 
intuition as “gut feelings” and “gut instincts” (e.g., Shapiro & Spence, 1997). Field 
research findings support the interplay between intuition and emotion. For example, forty 
percent of the professionals interviewed by Burke and Miller (1999) stated that intuition 
is based on an individual’s feelings or emotions.  
Combining the aforementioned characteristics of intuition (i.e., nonconscious, 
holistic, rapid, and affectively charged), Dane and Pratt (2007) defined intuition as 
“affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, nonconscious, and holistic 
associations” (p. 40). Since this definition aptly captures the key attributes of intuition in 
a concise manner, it is adopted in the present study. 
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Unitary versus Dual Process View of Intuition 
As we further explore the concept of intuition, it is important to distinguish 
between the two prevailing views on cognitive information processing. One set of 
scholars adopt a unitary view by arguing that intuition and analysis are opposite ends of a 
single continuum (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Baylor, 1997; Hammond et al., 1987; 
Simon, 1992). On one end of the spectrum is pure intuition where the decision is 
unjustifiable, inexpressible, and fast. On the other end is pure analysis where the decision 
is justifiable, expressible, and slow. Typically, a human judgment would fall somewhere 
along the continuum depending on the inherent cognitive decision style of the individual 
(i.e., intuitive versus analytic) as well as the properties of the task (e.g., prior experience 
with the same or similar task) (Hammond, 2010).  
Another set of scholars embrace a dual-process view of information processing 
(e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Evans, 2010; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Sinclair, & 
Ashkanasy, 2009). This view is grounded in cognitive-experiential self-theory (Epstein, 
1994); a theory that describes people as having two information processing systems, an 
experiential system [also referred to as system 1 (Kahneman, 2003), X system (Healey, 
Vouri, & Hodgkinson, 2015), and type 1 process (Evans, 2010)] and a rational system 
[also referred to as system 2 (Kahneman, 2003), C system (Healey et al., 2015), and type 
2 process (Evans, 2010)]. The experiential system, which is driven by emotion, is 
automatic and is responsible for non-analytical processes such as intuition (Epstein, 
2010). In contrast, the rational system is analytical and operates according to an 
individual’s understanding of logical inference (Epstein, 1994).  
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In contrast to the unitary view, according to the dual process view, intuition and 
analysis are distinct, independent constructs (Evans, 2010) that interact with each other 
both sequentially (i.e., one system followed by the other) and simultaneously (i.e., both 
systems competing at the same time) (Epstein, 2010). The relative dominance of one 
system is influenced by individual differences in cognitive style as well as situational 
factors such as perceived task difficulty (Epstein, 2010). Furthermore, as the two systems 
are independent, an individual may be high or low in one or both constructs (Pretz, 2008). 
The distinction between the unitary and dual process views is important as it 
determines not only how a researcher views the functioning of the cognitive process but 
also impacts the measurement of the construct as the measuring instruments are different 
based on the view. Although the debate continues on which one of the two views best 
represent the cognitive process, the dual process view has gained prominence in 
management research relating to cognitive information processing (e.g., Evans, 2010; 
Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Furthermore, as noted by Sadler-Smith and Burke-Smalley 
(2015), the dual process view provides a coherent theoretical framework that enables 
researchers to gain further insight into the workings of the mind. Therefore, in this paper, 
the human cognitive process is viewed through the dual process perspective.   
Necessary Conditions for Effective Intuitive Decision-making 
The preceding section discussed the concept and operation of intuition. The focus 
of this section is to examine the antecedents for effective intuitive decision-making. 
Based on extant literature relating to the topic, three conditions appear to impact the 
effectiveness of intuitive decision-making: (1) domain expertise, (2) task characteristics, 
and (3) task environment.  
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Domain Expertise 
Dane and Pratt (2007) argued that the effectiveness of an intuitive decision 
depends on the nature of the mental schemas in the mind of the individual. These 
schemas can either be (1) simple heuristics with minimal domain-relevant knowledge, or 
(2) complex cognitive maps with a high level of domain-specific information. The 
heuristic framework is domain independent and therefore lacks the domain sensitivity 
that is required to make an effective intuitive decision.  Furthermore, as the simplicity of 
the heuristic schemas lack the capacity to process the complex information presented in a 
problem, using such a framework to make an intuitive decision can lead to an erroneous 
decision (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Thus, heuristics is a flawed and inconsistent form of 
judgment (Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  
 However, an individual may also possess highly complex, domain-relevant 
mental schemas (Chase & Simon, 1973b; Dane & Pratt, 2007). These mental schemas are 
the result of extensive domain experience and are commonly referred to as ‘expert 
intuition’ (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Domain expertise has been found to lead to effective 
intuitive decisions (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2013; 
Hammond et al., 1987). However, the effectiveness of an expert’s intuitive judgment is 
restricted to their domain of expertise (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Therefore, an individual who 
is an expert in one domain may not be able to make an effective intuitive decision in a 
completely different domain.   
The origins of the school of thought supporting expert intuition can be traced back 
to the work of Chase and Simon (1973a; 1973b). Studying characteristics of master chess 
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players, Chase and Simon (1973b) found that chess grandmasters had the remarkable 
ability to rapidly process complex chess configurations. The authors estimated that chess 
masters are able to recognize 50,000 to 100,000 patterns and immediately identify the 
best move without much deliberation. This extraordinary ability can be credited to the 
well-developed, complex mental schemas that are a result of extensive practice and study 
of chess.   
In a separate experimental study, Chase and Simon (1973a) found that, compared 
to novice chess players, master chess players are able to extract more information from a 
brief exposure to a chess position. Hence, they were better able to re-construct those 
positions than novice chess players. The authors concluded that the superior performance 
of the master chess players is due to their ability to encode the chess positions to 
perceptual chunks, each of which contains familiar configurations of chess pieces. 
Interestingly, the master’s ability to re-construct the chess positions decreased when the 
chess pieces were randomly placed on the board rather than in true chess positions. 
Therefore, it is evident that the master’s superior performance was due to the mental 
models developed through prior experience and not due to greater memory capacity.  
In a more recent study, Dane et al. (2012) conducted two experiments to 
investigate the relationship between domain expertise and the effectiveness of an intuitive 
decision. Some participants were assigned to an intuitive condition while others were 
assigned to an analytical condition. Both groups were exposed to tasks (i.e., assessing the 
difficulty of a basketball shot and authenticating designer handbags) that is considered to 
be conducive to intuitive decision-making (a more elaborate discussion about task 
characteristics that are conducive to intuitive decision-making will follow in a subsequent 
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section). In both studies, it was found that the effectiveness of intuition, relative to 
analysis, is strengthened when the decision maker has high domain expertise, thus 
supporting the argument that expert intuition can lead to effective decision-making. 
Task Characteristics 
The characteristics of the task can have a significant impact on the effectiveness 
of using an intuitive versus an analytical decision-making approach. When dealing with 
problems that are conducive to analytical solutions, analytical decision-making may be 
best. But, when dealing with problems that are complex and ambiguous, intuitive 
decision-making may well be a better option (Denhardt & Dugan, 1978; Friedman, 
Howell, & Jensen, 1985; Hammond et al., 1987; Hogarth, 2002). Tasks that are 
conducive to analytical solutions, also referred to as intellective tasks (Dane & Pratt, 
2009), are highly decomposable (Hammond et al., 1987) and can be solved using reason 
or mathematical formulas. In such decomposable tasks, an individual is able to 
analytically solve the problem and articulate or illustrate the steps taken to derive the 
solution. Given these characteristics, intuition may not be effective for decomposable 
tasks (Dane et al., 2012).  
 In contrast, intuition has been found to be effective for complex tasks that are not 
as easily decomposed (e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004). Unlike decomposable 
tasks, these types of tasks are abstract and are difficult to solve using math and logical 
inference.  As a result, for complex and ambiguous tasks, also referred to as non-
decomposable tasks (Dane et al., 2012) and judgmental tasks (Hammond et al., 1987), it 
is difficult to derive a solution using a purely analytical process. Therefore, for complex 
tasks, intuition may be more effective as the intuitive process allows the individual to 
21 
 
 
 
make holistic judgments by considering the different aspects of the task that cannot be 
combined using an analytical method. As noted by Hodgkinson et al. (2009a), intuition is 
generally preferred by managers for unstructured tasks where there is no clear objective 
method to solve the problem. 
 Through five experimental studies, Dijksterhuis (2004) investigated the role of 
conscious (i.e., analytical reasoning) and unconscious thought (i.e., intuitive reasoning) in 
solving complex problems. Due to the low processing capacity of consciousness, for 
complex problems, which in this study was either selecting an apartment or selecting a 
roommate, the author hypothesized intuitive processing would be more effective than 
analytical processing. The results supported the hypothesis. The ineffectiveness of 
analytical processing may be due to the inability of the conscious mind to absorb and 
synthesize a large amount of information since individuals who use analytical processing 
pay too much attention to a limited number of attributes of the problem (Dijksterhuis, 
2004). On the other hand, the effectiveness of intuition to solve complex problems may 
be due to the remarkable ability of the human mind to unconsciously, automatically, and 
rapidly process a large number of disparate pieces of information.   
When discussing the impact of task complexity on the effectiveness of intuitive 
versus analytical decision-making, it is important to note the difference between task 
complexity and task difficulty. Complex tasks are difficult. However, certain tasks might 
be difficult, but may not necessarily be complex. The key difference is that complex 
tasks, in addition to being difficult, are typically ill-structured and ambiguous (Campbell, 
1988). For example, solving an advanced mathematical problem might be difficult. 
However, it is not ambiguous since the math problem can be accurately solved if one 
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follows the correct mathematical procedure. In contrast, estimating future stock prices is 
a complex task due to the ambiguity and the complexity of the stock market.    
Task Environment 
Decision-making context influences the use and effectiveness of intuition 
(Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). In dynamic and rapidly changing environments, when 
there are limited time and information to make a decision, and when there are conditions 
of ambiguity and uncertainty, individuals often have to rely on intuitive judgment 
(Denhardt & Dugan, 1978). According to Agor (1986), intuition may be useful under 
seven conditions; when there is a high level of uncertainty, there is no precedent to base 
the solution, variables are volatile, hard data is limited or does not provide clear direction, 
analytical data is insufficient, there is more than one reasonable solution, and time 
pressure is high. Supporting this argument, Burke and Miller (1999) noted five of their 
own conditions for when intuition may be helpful; when situations do not have 
predetermined guidelines, objective data are inaccurate, decisions need to be made 
quickly or unexpectedly, there is a high level of uncertainty, and clear cues are 
unavailable. When clear hard data are not available, one-way of dealing with the 
uncertainty is to rely on intuition (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004).   
Further insight into the impact of task environment on the effectiveness of 
intuition can be gleaned from the entrepreneurship literature. The cognitive style of the 
entrepreneur plays a pivotal role in the entrepreneurship process (Baldacchino, 
Ucbasaran, Cabantous, & Lockett, 2015). Compared to individuals with a preference for 
an analytical decision-making style, studies have found that entrepreneurs with a 
preference for an intuitive cognitive style are better suited for an environment where 
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there is greater level of uncertainty such as an entrepreneurial venture (Baldacchino et al., 
2015; Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa, & Whitcanack, 2009). This difference is because, in an 
uncertain environment, there is often no explicit rational choice or logical step-by-step 
solution available. Therefore, individuals cannot rely on analytical methods alone to 
derive a solution and intuition may be the only viable way to make a decision. As such, 
some scholars recognize intuition as the core of entrepreneurial action (Dutta & Crossan, 
2005).  
As described above, even though there is some evidence that intuition can be 
effective under certain conditions (i.e., when the decision maker has domain expertise, 
when the task is complex, and when the task environment has certain characteristics that 
are conducive to intuition decision-making), there is still a scarcity of empirical research 
that explore the effect of intuition in complex organizational settings. Employee selection 
is one of those settings. Given the significance of employee selection to the success of an 
organization, it is important to identify if intuition can be useful in making successful 
hiring decisions.  
Employee selection is a complex process that typically involves a high level of 
uncertainty, time pressure, insufficient data, and more than one reasonable solution, all of 
which are characteristics of an environment that may be conducive to intuitive decision-
making (Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999). However, there is little applied research that 
examines the effect of intuition in employee selection (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Miles 
& Sadler-Smith, 2014). The following section reviews this literature.  
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Intuitive versus Analytical Approaches in Employee Selection 
Both intuitive and analytical selection methods are used in employee selection. 
Intuitive hiring refers to the subjective, informal methods in which an interviewer makes 
a hiring decision typically derived through a traditional unstructured interview. In 
contrast, analytical hiring methods rely on objective techniques and decision aids such as 
structured interviews, standardized tests, cognitive ability tests, and personality tests. 
Existing research on recruitment has found analytical forms of employee selection to be 
more reliable and valid than unstructured interviews (Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & 
Arthur, 1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988). Therefore, scholars 
argue that analytical employee selection methods are more effective than intuitive 
methods (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Levashina et al., 2014).  
The higher validity of analytical hiring methods, compared to intuitive methods, 
is credited to the objectivity of the analytical techniques as well as the insusceptibility of 
those techniques to rater biases. Highhouse (2008b) argued that intuitive hiring methods 
make the errors in selection ambiguous (e.g., it is difficult to judge rater biases when 
there are no objective tools to compare candidates). Analytical approaches, on the other 
hand, make those errors visible and detectable (e.g., rater biases may be more detectable 
when standardized procedures, such as cognitive ability tests, allow objective comparison 
of the candidates).  
In a meta-analytic review, Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson (2000) found 
that, with regard to prediction of human behavior (e.g., academic performance, job 
success, criminal behavior), mechanical methods of combining data such as using a 
computer program to emulate expert judgment  (i.e., an analytical method) are as good as 
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or better than subjective (i.e., intuitive) judgments. Therefore, since the goal of a job 
interview is to accurately predict human behavior, these findings provide further support 
for the use of analytical over intuitive hiring methods. However, it should be noted that 
only two out of 136 studies included in the analysis were in an employee selection 
context and involved predicting job success. As such, it is difficult to generalize the 
findings to employee selection due to the small sample size. 
In spite of the academic arguments supporting the use of analytical hiring 
methods, most practitioners rely on intuition when making hiring decisions (Colarelli & 
Thompson, 2008; Diab et al., 2011; Highhouse & Kostek, 2013). Using in-depth 
interviews with hiring managers, Miles and Sadler-Smith (2014) attempted to understand 
why managers use intuition over analysis when making employee selection decisions. 
The authors found that some of the predominant reasons included personal preference, 
resource constraints, and recognition of the limitations of more structured approaches. 
Participants considered intuition to be derived from experience and consequently, their 
confidence in making an intuitive hiring decision increased with experience. Nonetheless, 
the participants also recognized the limitations of intuition, such as biased judgment 
based on stereotypes, and acknowledged that intuition may be more effective when 
combined with analytical methods (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).  
As further evidence of practitioner’s use of intuition over analysis, out of 166 line 
managers interviewed in a study conducted by Nowicki and Rosse (2002), most believed 
that their past successful hires were due to intuition and luck. Consequently, the authors 
concluded that although there is research in academia that links analytical recruiting 
practices to post-hire outcomes, there is very little interest among practitioners. To 
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illustrate, the authors provide data from the American Management Association (1997) 
that shows only 28 percent of employers used a cognitive ability test and only 19 percent 
used personality tests.  
There are some academic arguments that support the practitioner’s preference for 
intuition over analysis in employee selection. Arguments supporting the use of intuition 
in employee selection generally fall under two categories: holism and thin slices.   
Holism. Holism is a school of thought founded on the premise that assessment of 
future success requires considering the whole person, not just selective facets such as 
personality or cognitive ability (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Langhammer, 2013). Those 
with a holistic view consider analytical techniques to be secondary to expert judgment. 
Those who advocate holism believe that expert intuition is the only way to understand 
how different attributes interact to create a complex whole (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013). 
Moreover, expert intuition is not only useful to collect information but also to 
appropriately combine the various forms of data to make a holistic decision (Highhouse 
& Kostek, 2013). From a practitioner perspective, a holistic approach to integrating the 
interview process data has been found to be more favorable than analytical methods 
(Diab et al., 2011). However, the academic arguments supporting holism are mostly 
conceptual and lack empirical support (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013).  
Thin slices. Thin slice research typically involves getting untrained raters to 
evaluate individuals by viewing short video recordings of their nonverbal behavior 
(Eisenkraft, 2013; Murphy et al., 2015). These video recordings are typically only a few 
seconds in length. Research has found that judgments based on thin slices can accurately 
predict various outcomes (Ambady, Krabbenhoft, & Hogan 2006; Ambady, Koo, 
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Rosenthal, & Winograd, 2002a; Ambady, LaPlante, Nguyen, Rosenthal, Chaumeton, & 
Levinson, 2002b; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993) including employee job performance 
(Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992).  
Eisenkraft (2013) argued that the collective intuitive judgments based on thin 
slices are stronger than a single interviewers' intuitive judgment. Thus, Eisenkraft (2013) 
concluded that an intuition based first impression will typically not be a valid predictor of 
job performance unless the intuitive judgments of multiple interviewers are combined. 
Miles and Sadler-Smith (2014), who conducted a qualitative study of hiring managers, 
concur by stating that collecting interview judgments of multiple interviewers will be 
more effective and will help to negate individual biases. In contrast, Huffcutt and Woehr 
(1999) who conducted a meta-analytic review of interview studies found that a panel of 
interviewers does not increase validity, and may, in fact, have a detrimental effect.   
 To summarize, even though there are some scholarly arguments supporting the 
use of intuition in recruitment, the general consensus among academics is that analytical 
forms of employee selection are superior to intuition (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse & 
Kostek, 2013; Levashina et al., 2014). Practitioners, however, still largely rely on 
intuition to make hiring decisions (Diab et al., 2011). From an academic perspective, is it 
possible that scholars were too quick to dismiss the potential use of intuition in employee 
selection without fully understanding the conditions in which intuition may, in fact, be 
helpful? Thus far, scholars have not thoroughly examined contextual factors that could 
impact the effectiveness of intuition in employee selection. 
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Impact of Context on the Effectiveness of Intuition 
When studying why hiring managers tend to favor intuition over analysis, context 
is a critical factor to consider (Colarelli & Thompson, 2008). Perceived effectiveness of 
intuitive hiring decisions can vary based on context (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). 
Klimoski and Jones (2008) suggested that the needs of the decision maker are often the 
result of context. Managers may rely on intuition, as opposed to analytical selection 
methods, due to the inability to sustain a complex selection program as well as the 
perceived benefits of using such a program. The level of accountability of the decision 
maker to other stakeholders in the organization may also have an impact on the decision-
making approach. Furthermore, financial considerations may influence the decision 
maker to intuitively select a candidate rather than investing in an elaborate employee 
selection program (Klimoski & Jones, 2008). 
Miles and Sadler-Smith (2014) found that intuition was perceived to be effective 
in situations where hard data was either not available or inadequate to make a hiring 
decision. In these circumstances, intuition allowed the interviewer to assess and obtain an 
overall impression of the candidate. On the other hand, intuition was perceived to be less 
effective when assessments were necessary to test an individual’s level of competence, 
when it caused stereotyping, and when it was used in an unstructured way. The authors 
noted that intuition becomes particularly important if a pool of candidates is identified as 
equally competent through analytical methods. In such a situation, an intuitive decision 
based on face-to-face interviews might be the only way to distinguish between the 
candidates (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).  
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Therefore, context appears to have a significant impact on the use and 
effectiveness of intuition in employee selection. The context could include task-related 
factors such as task complexity. Recall that task complexity is an antecedent for effective 
intuitive decision-making. Thus, in order to draw a comparison between intuition and 
employee selection research, the following section discusses the extant research in 
employee selection that focuses on the role of job complexity on the effectiveness of 
intuitive decision-making.    
Impact of Job Complexity on the Effectiveness of Intuition 
Even though research, in general, has found analytical forms of employee 
selection to outperform intuitive judgments (Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 
1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiesner & Cronshaw, 1988), when it comes to complex 
jobs, the findings are somewhat contradictory (Levashina et al., 2014).  Complex jobs are 
positions that have higher information processing demands (Hunter, Schmidt, & 
Judiesch, 1990). For simple jobs, since there is a clear cause-effect relationship to job 
performance, it is easier to specify evaluation standards (Dipboye, 1994). However, for 
complex jobs, it is much more difficult to specify evaluation standards or to identify 
factors that contribute towards good job performance (Chen, Tsai, & Hu, 2008). This is 
because there is no clear connection between an individual’s skills, knowledge, and prior 
experience to subsequent job performance. Thus, it is problematic to create standardized 
selection metrics, such as standardized tests, for positions that are high in complexity 
(Chen et al., 2008). 
In intuition research, scholars have found that an intuitive decision-making style 
is better suited for situations that are complex, uncertain, high in time pressure, have 
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insufficient data, and when there is more than one reasonable option (e.g., Agor, 1986; 
Burke & Miller, 1999).  An employee selection environment typically consists of these 
characteristics. This is especially true for complex positions where there is a high level of 
uncertainty as there is no definite connection between a candidate’s qualifications and 
future job performance (e.g., managerial positions). As such, intuition is a way to assess 
candidates for positions where the antecedents for effective job performance are not 
easily identifiable or measurable (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). 
Highhouse and Kostek (2013) note that milder forms of holistic belief systems 
(i.e. an intuitive approach) are held by organizational psychologists who conduct 
assessments for managerial and executive level positions. Since these type of positions 
can be categorized as complex jobs, Highhouse and Kostek’s (2013) statement supports 
the argument that intuitive assessments may be useful for complex positions. As 
Highhouse (2008b) noted, the support for holistic assessment for a high-level job is based 
on the idea that the complex characteristics of a high-level job candidate can only be 
assessed by an equally complex individual (i.e., an individual who understands the 
idiosyncrasies of the position and the candidate, and is able to holistically combine the 
available data to make an effective hiring decision). 
Through a review of employment interview literature, Levashina et al. (2014) 
note that there have been mixed findings regarding the validity of the structured interview 
(i.e., an analytical technique) for high complexity jobs. The authors noted that, in most 
studies, the validity of structured interviews decrease for high complexity jobs. These 
findings further support the argument that analytical employee selection methods alone 
may not be ideal for high-complexity jobs (Levashina et al., 2014). 
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Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, and Klehe (2004), who conducted a meta-analysis to 
determine the effects of job complexity on the validity of the structured interview, got a 
slightly different result. Even though these authors found increased job complexity to 
decrease the validity of the situational-interview, the validity of the patterned-behavior-
description-interview was not affected. However, although both of these interview types 
are considered structured interviews, the patterned-behavior-description-interview can be 
considered less structured as it does not always require standardization (Conway & 
Peneno, 1999). For example, a patterned-behavior-description-interview allows asking 
probing questions whereas the situational-interview does not. As such, compared to the 
situational-interview, the patterned-behavior-description-interview provides an 
opportunity for intuitive assessment. Therefore, the finding that the patterned-behavior-
description-interview is not affected by job complexity does not necessarily contradict 
the notion that intuitive judgment might be effective for complex jobs.     
Huffcutt et al. (2004) discussed two potential reasons for the moderating effect of 
job complexity on the situational interview. First is the inadequacy of the scoring system. 
Although the standard situational scoring system may work well for low to medium 
complex jobs, for highly complex jobs, the scoring system may not be detailed enough to 
capture the more complex answers provided by the applicants. Second, because a 
complex job will have more complicated facets, it will be difficult to come up with 
hypothetical situational questions that accurately measure the applicant’s ability to 
perform complex tasks. Therefore, the quality of the situational questions may not be 
sufficient to accurately assess a candidate for a complex job (Huffcutt et al., 2004). 
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Overall, research findings seem to suggest that job complexity has an impact on 
the effectiveness of the hiring method. As job complexity increases, the effectiveness of 
analytical hiring methods decrease (Levashina et al., 2014) and the effectiveness of 
intuitive hiring may increase. In addition to job complexity, since the decision maker’s 
domain expertise has been found to increase the quality of intuitive judgment (e.g., Chase 
& Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2013; Hammond et al., 1987), the 
following section focuses on the impact of the interviewer’s domain expertise on the 
effectiveness of intuitive hiring decisions. 
Impact of Domain Expertise on the Effectiveness of Intuition 
Practitioners tend to believe that the ability to make good intuitive hiring 
decisions increase with experience (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014).  Highhouse (2008b) 
referred to this phenomenon as the ‘myth of expertise’ and concluded that different types 
of rater bias limit the accuracy of intuitive judgments. Examples of such rater bias 
include; anchoring (i.e., tendency to rely on the first piece of information to judge 
subsequent data), halo bias (i.e., tendency to judge a candidate by the overall impression 
and not accurately evaluate the individual on relevant dimensions), and similar-to-me 
bias (i.e., tendency to gravitate towards candidates who are similar to oneself) (Dries, 
2013). In addition, factors such as overconfidence, hindsight bias, personal political 
objectives, and the desire to look like an expert may impact the intuitive judgment of an 
interviewer (Highhouse, 2008a).  Therefore, some academics argue that an interviewer’s 
intuitive ability to accurately predict the job performance of an applicant does not 
increase with experience (Highhouse, 2008b; Highhouse and Kostek, 2013). 
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 Those who support intuitive hiring methods view expert intuition as the only way 
to identify how disparate elements interact to create a complex whole (Highhouse & 
Kostek, 2013). For one, experts have the capacity to identify idiosyncrasies in a 
candidate's profile. For another, compared to non-experts, experts are better able to 
interpret configurations of traits (Highhouse, 2008b). As such, not only is expert intuition 
important in collecting candidate information, it is also important to accurately combine 
the data collected from different sources (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013).  Dipboye (1994) 
who compared the validity of the structured versus unstructured interview, observed that 
since experts generally have more complex, reliable, and accessible knowledge structures 
than non-experts, compared to non-experts, expert interviewers may be somewhat more 
effective in making intuitive hiring decisions. However, the author concluded that even 
an expert is unlikely to match the accuracy of analytical selection methods. 
 To summarize, although there are some arguments to the contrary, the general 
consensus among scholars in employee selection is that expertise does not increase the 
interviewer’s ability to make an effective intuitive hiring decision. In contrast, intuition 
research has repeatedly found expertise to impact the effectiveness of intuition (e.g., 
Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 2012; Dijkstra et al., 2013; Hammond et al., 1987). 
The reason for the discrepancy might be the fact that employee selection research has not 
thoroughly considered factors, such as job complexity, that could impact an expert 
interviewer’s intuitive judgment.  
 In further exploring the impact of interviewer related factors on the effectiveness 
of intuition, another aspect to consider is the decision maker’s cognitive style. The 
34 
 
 
 
following section explains what cognitive style is and how it impacts decision-making, 
especially in relation to employee selection.  
Impact of Cognitive Style on Decision Quality 
Cognitive style refers to an individual’s inherent tendency to use either an 
analytical or intuitive style for information processing and decision-making (Brigham et 
al., 2007). Based on the premise of dual-process theory, which views intuition and 
analysis to be distinct, independent constructs (Evans, 2010), Hodgkinson and Clark 
(2007) argue that individuals fall into one of four cognitive categories in terms of their 
preference for intuitive or analytical information processing (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Basic Typology of Contrasting Cognitive Strategies and Style 
 
As depicted in Hodgkinson and Clark’s (2007) conceptual framework, individuals 
in the detail conscious category are highly analytical and seldom rely on intuition. In 
contrast, those who are big picture conscious are highly intuitive and tend to ignore the 
details. The non-discerning are those who try to exert minimal cognitive resources either 
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for analytical or intuitive information processing. However, individuals categorized as 
cognitively versatile are high in both intuitive and analytical decision-making ability and 
have the skill to switch between the two modes depending on the situation. 
Cognitive style does not change over time (Brigham et al., 2007) and individuals 
generally have a predisposition to either be more intuitive or analytical (Epstein, Pacini, 
Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Norris & Epstein, 2011). Furthermore, cognitive style has 
been found to have an impact on how individuals make decisions (e.g., Dutta & 
Thornhill, 2008) as well as the outcomes of those decisions (e.g., Sadler-Smith, 2004).  
An individual’s inherent cognitive style is not always the same as the actual decision-
making approach employed by that individual to make a decision (Blume & Covin, 
2011). The actual decision-making approach used to solve a problem is termed cognitive 
strategy (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007). While cognitive style is the preference to use 
either an intuitive or an analytical approach to information processing and decision-
making, cognitive strategy is the actual use of either an intuitive or analytical style in a 
given situation (Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007). A mismatch between cognitive style and 
cognitive strategy may result in a negative outcome. For example, Brigham et al. (2007) 
found that, in highly structured work environments (i.e., an environment prone to 
analytical decision-making), owner-managers who have an intuitive cognitive style were 
less satisfied than those who have an analytical cognitive style.    
In employee selection, research has found that the cognitive style of interviewers 
impacts the preference for intuitive or analytical hiring methods (e.g., Miles & Sadler-
Smith, 2014). For example, interviewers who are analytical have a more favorable 
perception towards the structured interview (Levashina et al., 2014). Conversely, 
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managers who are inherently intuitive tend to use an intuitive style in employee selection 
(Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). Lodato, Highhouse, and Brooks (2011) found that 
professionals who prefer intuition in employee selection are typically experiential 
thinkers, are less experienced, are employed by a smaller firm, and do not have advanced 
professional certification. Overall, based on extant findings, it is apparent that the 
interviewer’s cognitive style has an impact on the preference to use either an intuitive or 
analytical selection approach. Moreover, it appears that individuals are more inclined to 
use their inherent cognitive style to make hiring decisions. 
 To summarize, factors such as job complexity, interviewer domain expertise, and 
the interviewer’s cognitive style may impact the effectiveness of intuition in employee 
selection. Since intuition has been found to be effective for domain experts when solving 
complex problems, it is possible that intuitive hiring can be effective for expert 
interviewers when recruiting for complex jobs. However, given conditions that may be 
conducive to intuitive decision-making (i.e., complex tasks), we have little knowledge of 
factors that could inhibit an expert’s intuitive judgment. One such potential factor is 
decision accountability. The following section discusses the role of decision 
accountability on expert intuition. 
Role of Decision Accountability on Expert Intuition 
Research on accountability has shown that, when individuals are required to 
justify their decisions, under certain conditions, they use more complex information 
processing strategies (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983). As such, decision 
accountability can prompt an individual to evaluate their cognitive processes in an 
analytical manner. More specifically, procedural accountability, which is a sub-
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dimension of accountability, has been found to lead to a more extensive analysis of 
information (e.g., Doney & Armstrong, 1996).  
As described in Chapter 1, procedural accountability is the extent to which an 
individual is held accountable to the quality of the procedure used in making a decision 
(Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996). Brtek and Motowidlo (2002), who 
examined the effect of procedural and outcome accountability on interview validity, 
found attentiveness to mediate the positive relationship between procedural 
accountability and decision quality. Since attentiveness is a conscious, deliberate state of 
mind, the findings of Brtek and Motowidlo (2002) support the notion that procedural 
accountability may prompt analytical cognitive processing. 
Analytical cognitive processing, in turn, may disrupt the effectiveness of intuition 
(Baumeister, 1984; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Through multiple experiments, Wilson 
and Schooler (1991) found that introspection, a form of analytical reasoning, has a 
detrimental effect on decision quality. The authors concluded that too much thinking 
about an issue causes individuals to focus on non-optimal criteria, thereby resulting in a 
non-optimal decision. Similarly, metacognition (i.e., controlled thought process where 
one reflects on one’s actions) may have an unfavorable effect on intuition as the 
metacognitive process interrupts intuitive thinking (Baylor, 1997; Baylor, 2001). 
The negative effect of analytical cognitive processing on intuition may be 
amplified in conditions that are conducive to intuitive decision-making (i.e., when the 
decision maker has domain expertise and when the task is complex). For example, Dane 
et al. (2012) found that, when solving non-decomposable tasks (i.e., tasks that cannot 
easily be solved using analytical procedures), experts perform worse using analysis than 
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intuition. Thus, given tasks that are conducive to intuitive decision-making, analytical 
cognitive processing seems to disrupt an expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive 
decision. Research relating to clinical decision-making (Wimmers et al., 2005), motor 
skills (e.g., Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock et al., 2002; Gray, 2004), and verbal 
overshadowing (e.g., Lane & Schooler, 2004; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Melcher & 
Schooler, 2004) provides further evidence that analysis may effect intuition.  
Contrary to the general finding that analysis may disrupt expert intuition, in a 
study that explored the effects of expertise and cognitive strategy on solving complex 
problems related to college life, Pretz (2008) found that more experienced individuals 
scored better when required to use an analytical strategy than an intuitive strategy. 
However, there are limitations of the study that could have caused the anomaly. For one, 
the majority of the items selected to represent complex problems in Pretz’s (2008) study 
were social and inter-personal problems such as living with a stealing roommate and 
maintaining friendships (see Figure 2 for an example). Since these problems were social 
in nature, they do not necessarily represent problems that would require extensive 
domain-specific experience.  
Recall that expert intuition refers to highly complex, domain-relevant mental 
schemas that are a result of extensive experience in the focal domain (Chase & Simon, 
1973b; Dane & Pratt, 2007). Examples of such domain experts include seasoned 
firefighters and chess grandmasters. In comparison, the social problems used for Pretz’s 
(2008) study lack the level of domain specificity that typically leads to expert intuition. In 
addition, Pretz (2008) measured domain expertise by college tenure. Given the social 
nature of the problems, it is not clear that college tenure would count as domain relevant 
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expertise. Therefore, although Pretz’s (2008) findings may generalize to social problem-
solving behavior among undergraduates, the findings do not provide strong support to the 
argument that experts are better off using analysis than intuition.   
Figure 2 
Sample Problems – Pretz (2008) 
 
Purpose and Research Questions 
 As already noted, analytical employee selection methods have been repeatedly 
found to outperform intuitive methods when recruiting for low complexity jobs (e.g., 
Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiener & 
Cronshaw, 1988). However, and as also previously discussed, when job complexity 
increase, the effectiveness of analytical techniques has been found to decrease (Huffcutt 
et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 2014). Consequently, for complex jobs, intuition may be a 
better way to make an effective hiring decision. Therefore, and as discussed in chapter 1, 
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the current study seeks to answer the following research questions: can intuition lead to 
accurate hiring decisions for complex jobs; and if so, under what conditions is this more 
likely to occur?  
 Since the decision maker’s domain expertise has been found to impact the 
effectiveness of intuitive judgment for complex tasks (e.g., Dane et al., 2012), the present 
study investigated if these findings hold true in a specific context – that of employee 
selection. In addition, an individual’s cognitive style has an impact on the decision-
making process (Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Hence, this study attempted to answer the 
aforementioned research questions by examining the impact of the interviewer’s domain 
expertise and cognitive style on the effectiveness of an intuitive hiring decision when 
recruiting for a complex job.  
 This paper also attempted to investigate common organizational factors that could 
disrupt an expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive decision. More specifically, the 
paper explored how introducing procedural accountability impacts expert intuition, and 
as described earlier, considered the research question: how does procedural 
accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s intuitive judgment?    
 In order to answer the research questions of this study, the following section 
details the hypotheses for factors that influence the effectiveness of intuition when 
recruiting for complex jobs.  
Hypotheses Development 
 The effectiveness of intuition can be influenced by individual factors such as the 
decision maker’s domain expertise and cognitive style as well as contextual factors such 
as task complexity. When attempting to examine the conditions in which intuition can be 
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an effective mode of decision-making, it is important to consider the impact of such 
factors. Accordingly, this paper examined the impact of interviewer’s domain expertise 
(i.e., prior experience in recruiting for a complex job) and cognitive style on the accuracy 
of an intuitive hiring decision when recruiting for a complex job. Hypotheses 1-3 
explored these factors.  
 Given conditions that are conducive to intuitive decision-making, it is also 
important to consider what organizational factors could disrupt an expert’s ability to 
make an effective intuitive decision. Specifically, hypothesis 4 focused on the impact of 
procedural accountability on expert intuition. However, since job complexity is a 
necessary condition for each hypothesis, it is important to first clarify job complexity 
within the context of this study. 
Job Complexity 
Consistent with Campbell’s (1984) definition of complexity (and as defined in 
chapter 1), a complex job is a position that has many tacit elements that leads to 
successful job performance. Similar to expert intuition, tacit knowledge involves the 
development of mental models that shape an individual’s perspective and their 
understanding of how best to proceed in a given situation and is a result of extensive 
experience in a specific domain (Nonaka, 1994). Unlike explicit knowledge, which 
involves codifiable facts and theories, tacit knowledge involves knowing “how” (Grant, 
1996), in such a way that the knowledge cannot easily be codified (Nonaka, 1994).  
Since there are only a few tacit elements that lead to job success when job 
complexity is low, it is relatively easier to ascertain the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
that are required for successful job performance. This is because the job requirements for 
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a low complexity job are fairly straightforward. For example, the qualifications of 
stenographers can be adequately assessed by testing their short handwriting skills, typing 
speed and accuracy, and transcription skills. Thus, the lower the job complexity, the 
clearer the prescriptive causes of good performance, and the easier it is to standardize 
selection criteria (Dipboye, 1994). Consequently, since the objective data clearly 
establishes the qualifications of the candidate, the interviewer does not need to use their 
intuitive judgment to make a hiring decision. This argument is reinforced in employee 
selection research as analytical selection methods have typically been found to be more 
reliable than intuitive methods for low complexity jobs (e.g., Conway et al., 1995; 
Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Levashina et al., 2014; Wiener & Cronshaw, 1988). 
 In contrast, when job complexity is high, it is much more difficult to specify 
evaluation standards or to identify factors that contribute to good job performance due to 
the ambiguity surrounding the correct formula for successful job performance (Chen et 
al., 2008). For example, studies have found that the validity of the structured interview 
(an analytical method) is lower for complex jobs (Huffcutt et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 
2014; Pulakos & Schmitt, 1995) such as federal investigative agents, managers, 
physicians, and engineers. This is likely due to the inadequacy of the structured questions 
to capture the complex performance outcomes as well as the inability of the standardized 
scoring system to adequately rate the answers given by candidates for complex positions 
(Huffcutt et al., 2004).  
 Based on the aforementioned findings, the argument that task complexity is a 
necessary condition for effective intuition appears to hold true in an employee selection 
context. Intuition may be more effective for complex jobs and not so effective for low 
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complexity jobs. Given that analytical methods have been repeatedly found to outperform 
intuition for low complexity jobs, it seems a futile exercise to measure the impact of 
intuition for low complexity jobs. Therefore, the present study solely focused on complex 
jobs.   
 Having clarified job complexity within the context of this study, and laying the 
foundation that intuition may be an effective method of decision-making for complex 
jobs, the next section presents the hypothesis that compares the effectiveness of intuitive 
versus analytical hiring decisions for complex jobs.  
 As depicted in Figure 3, I argue that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring 
decision is greater when the interviewers use intuitive rather than analytical selection 
processes. This is also the main effect as depicted in Figure 4, cells I versus A.  
Figure 3 
Conceptual Model for Hypotheses 1-3 
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 Building on the previous argument, I also propose that when the decision maker is 
an expert, the accuracy of an intuitive decision over analysis is amplified (cells EI versus 
EA in Figure 4). Furthermore, I expect that those who are experts to be able to make 
more accurate intuitive hiring decisions than those who are non-experts (cells EI versus 
NI in Figure 4).  
Figure 4 
Accuracy of Intuition versus Analysis for Complex Jobs 
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Accuracy of Intuition versus Analysis for Complex Jobs 
Although the debate continues, there is some evidence that intuition may be more 
effective than analytical decision-making for complex and ill-structured tasks. When the 
task is complex (Dijksterhuis, 2004), and the decision-making environment is uncertain, 
complex, and/or subject to time pressures (Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999), intuition 
may be a more appropriate way to make a decision. In support, Dijksterhuis (2004) used 
a series of experiments to investigate the role of conscious (i.e., analytical) and 
unconscious (i.e., intuitive) thought in solving complex tasks. The tasks in his study were 
choosing an apartment and choosing a roommate, both of which were ill-structured and 
ambiguous tasks. Throughout the experiments, intuition was found to be more effective 
than analysis in making quality decisions.  
 The ability of intuition to outperform analysis for complex tasks can be attributed 
to the limitations of the conscious mind to process a large number of disparate pieces of 
information (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dane & Pratt, 2007, Simon, 1957). Due to this limited 
capacity, the conscious mind tends to focus on a restricted number of problem attributes. 
These attributes may even be non-optimal criteria, which in turn produce non-optimal 
results (Hogarth, 2002). The unconscious mind, on the other hand, is able to holistically 
combine disparate pieces of information to provide an effective solution. Therefore, 
compared to intuitive thought, analytical thought is more likely to lead to extreme errors 
(Hammond et al., 1987). 
 In an employee selection context, recruiting for a complex job is equivalent to a 
complex task. Recall that a complex job is a position that has numerous tacit elements 
that lead to successful job performance. Since tacit elements cannot be explicitly stated, 
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an accurate prototype of an ideal employee cannot be developed. It is subsequently 
difficult to explicitly state the selection criteria for complex jobs. Therefore, a purely 
analytical selection process may not be effective for candidate selection. Supporting this 
argument, research has found that as job complexity increases, the effectiveness of 
analytical selection methods decreases (Huffcutt et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 2014; 
Pulakos & Schmitt, 1995).  
Considering the inadequacy of analytical hiring methods for complex jobs, and 
since intuition has been found to be more effective than analysis for complex tasks, I 
argue that, for a complex job, an intuitive hiring decision will be more accurate than an 
analytical hiring decision. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater when 
decision makers use an intuitive (I) rather than analytical (A) decision-making 
process. 
Impact of Domain Expertise on the Accuracy of Intuition over Analysis    
Building on hypothesis above, it is important to consider the conditions in which 
the effectiveness of intuition over analysis is amplified. As such, the purpose of this 
section is to explore the impact of interviewer expertise on the effectiveness of intuition 
over analysis when recruiting for a complex job (i.e., comparison of cell EI and EA in 
Figure 3). An expert interviewer is one that has experience in recruiting for a particularly 
complex job category such as healthcare professionals. 
Given a complex task, the effectiveness of intuition has been found to be greater 
when the decision maker has domain expertise (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dijkstra et 
al, 2013; Hammond et al., 1987). Individuals gain domain expertise when they have an 
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extensive domain related knowledge and experience. As a result of this knowledge and 
experience, domain experts develop highly complex, domain-relevant mental schemas 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007). Using these mental schemas, domain experts are often able to 
make highly accurate intuitive decisions (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). For example, Chase 
and Simon (1973b) found that chess grandmasters were able to instantaneously recognize 
50,000 to 100,000 chess patterns and make the best move without much reflection.  
In comparison, expertise may not increase the effectiveness of an analytical 
decision for a complex task. For example, Dane et al. (2012) found that, among 
participants who used analysis to solve a complex task, there was no significant 
difference in task performance between those with high expertise and those with low 
expertise. In fact, other studies have found that prompting an expert to use analysis may 
negatively impact decision quality (e.g., Wimmers et al., 2005, Melcher & Schooler, 
2004). This may be especially true for complex tasks that, because they are ill-structured 
and ambiguous in nature, may not have clear objective criteria for making an accurate 
decision. Therefore, if experts are prompted to use analysis to solve a complex task, they 
may focus on non-optimal criteria that may limit the effectiveness of their decision. 
Based on the preceding discussion, although expertise has a positive impact on 
the effectiveness of intuition, it may not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
analysis. In fact, expertise may limit the effectiveness of analytical decision-making for 
complex tasks. Therefore, I argue that domain experts who use intuition to solve a 
domain relevant complex task will be more effective than those who use analysis. In line 
with this argument, when recruiting for a complex job, if the interviewer is an expert with 
prior experience in recruiting for a similar complex job, intuition may be more useful 
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than analysis to make an accurate hiring decision. This is because, due to highly 
developed and domain-relevant mental schemas, an expert interviewer may be better able 
to holistically combine the disparate pieces of available information about the candidate. 
Since a complex job has many tacit elements that lead to successful job performance, the 
elaborate mental schemas allow the expert interviewer to unconsciously and 
automatically consider these tacit elements and determine the compatibility of the 
candidate. 
Conversely, if the expert interviewer is required to make an analytical hiring 
decision, since it is difficult to set accurate selection standards for a complex job, the 
interviewer will be forced to focus on non-optimal criteria. A decision based on non-
optimal criteria will lead to a non-optimal decision. Thus, compared to an intuitive 
decision that holistically combines the explicit as well as the implicit elements for job 
success, an expert interviewer’s analytical decision will be less accurate. Therefore, I 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2a: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater 
when the interviewer is an expert and the interviewer uses intuitive (EI) rather 
than analytical (EA) decision processes. 
Impact of Expert versus Non-Expert on the Accuracy of Intuition  
 As discussed in the development of hypothesis one, for a complex job, intuition is 
a more effective mode of decision-making than analysis. In addition, as argued in the 
development of hypothesis 2a, for a complex job, the accuracy of intuition over analysis 
is amplified when the decision maker has domain expertise. This section will focus on the 
impact of interviewer domain expertise in increasing the accuracy of intuition. For this 
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purpose, the accuracy of an intuitive decision between experts and non-experts will be 
compared (i.e., cell EI and NI in Figure 3). 
The effectiveness of an intuitive decision depends on the nature of the domain 
relevant mental schemas established in the mind of the decision maker. These mental 
schemas can either be (1) simple heuristics with minimal domain-relevant knowledge, or 
(2) complex cognitive maps with a high level of domain-specific information (Dane & 
Pratt, 2007). Those with simple heuristics are individuals who have little to no knowledge 
and experience in the focal domain. Due to this reason, the non-expert’s mental schemas 
lack the domain sensitivity and the capacity to process the information presented in a 
complex problem. Thus, an intuitive decision of a non-expert may not be optimal.     
 However, as previously noted, due to extensive domain-relevant knowledge and 
experience, an expert possesses highly complex, domain-relevant mental schemas. These 
complex mental schemas allow the expert to quickly and automatically process a large 
amount of disparate information and make an effective intuitive decision. Thus, 
compared to a non-expert, and expert’s intuitive judgment is much more effective.  
Consistent with the argument above, Chase and Simon (1973a) found that, 
compared to novice chess players, master chess players are able to extract more 
information from a brief exposure to a chess position. As a result, they were better able to 
re-construct those positions than novice chess players. The authors concluded that the 
superior performance of the master chess players is due to their ability to encode the 
chess positions to perceptual chunks, each of which contains familiar configurations of 
chess pieces.  
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Similarly, Dane et al. (2012), who conducted two experimental studies to examine 
the impact of domain expertise on the effectiveness of intuition, found that there was a 
significant difference in the task performance between participants with high expertise 
and participants with low expertise. In the first study, which asked participants to assess 
the difficulty of a basketball shot, domain expertise was determined by the number of 
years of experience playing competitive basketball. In the second study, which asked 
participants to identify real and fake designer handbags, domain expertise was 
determined by the total number of designer handbags owned by each participant. In both 
studies, those with high domain expertise outperformed those with low domain expertise 
thus supporting the argument that domain expertise can increase the effectiveness of an 
intuitive decision. 
Contrary to the findings of research related to intuition, in employee selection, 
some scholars argue that the effectiveness of intuition does not increase with experience 
(Highhouse, 2008b). Much of this argument is based on the success of analytical 
techniques over interviewer’s intuition in selecting candidates for low complexity jobs. 
However, since the effectiveness of analytical methods has been found to diminish as job 
complexity increases, interviewer expertise may have a critical role in making an 
effective hiring decision. As noted by Dipboye (1994), since experts generally have more 
complex, reliable, and accessible knowledge structures than non-experts, compared to 
non-experts, expert interviewers may be more effective in making intuitive hiring 
decisions. This is because, compared to non-experts, experts have a higher capacity to 
identify idiosyncrasies of a candidate and to interpret configurations of traits that lead to 
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job success. In addition, experts may be better able to holistically combine the candidate 
data collected from different sources to make an effective intuitive decision.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, I argue that interviewer expertise increases the 
accuracy of a hiring decision if the position being recruited for is a complex job. This 
argument is, in fact, consistent with the research in intuition that has found expertise to 
increase the effectiveness of intuitive decisions when solving complex tasks. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2b: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater 
when the decision maker using intuitive selection processes is an expert (EI) 
rather than a non-expert (NI) 
Impact of Cognitive Style on the Accuracy of a Hiring Decision  
The hypotheses so far only considered one interviewer related factor that impacts 
the accuracy of intuitive and analytical hiring decisions, namely interviewer’s domain 
expertise. As discussed earlier, another aspect to consider is the interviewer’s cognitive 
style. As such, the next hypothesis focuses on the impact of the interviewer’s cognitive 
style on the accuracy of intuitive and analytical hiring decisions (i.e., comparison of cell 
II and AA with IA and AI in Figure 5) 
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Figure 5  
Impact of Cognitive Style on the Accuracy of a Hiring Decision 
 
  Most individuals are predisposed to prefer one cognitive style over the other 
(Epstein et al., 1996; Norris & Epstein, 2011). This preference then influences the 
individual’s approach to solving a problem (Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). Those with an 
analytical style prefer a deliberate, logical approach whereas those with an intuitive style 
prefer a more ‘gut feeling’ approach.  
As it relates to employee selection, the cognitive style of interviewers impacts the 
preference for intuitive or analytical hiring methods (e.g., Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014). 
Interviewers who are analytical have a more favorable perception towards analytical 
selection methods (Levashina et al., 2014). For example, Chen et al. (2008) found that 
those who have an analytical cognitive style (versus those that have an intuitive cognitive 
style) had positive reactions towards the highly structured interview, which is an 
analytical style interview. These authors also found that interviewers with an analytical 
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cognitive style reacted more positively towards the highly structured interview for high 
complexity jobs. On the other hand, managers with an intuitive cognitive style prefer to 
use their intuition in employee selection (Lodato et al., 2011; Miles & Sadler-Smith, 
2014). 
 A mismatch between an individual’s inherent cognitive style and the cognitive 
strategy (i.e., the actual decision-making approach) used to solve a particular problem 
may result in a negative outcome (Hodgkinson & Clark, 2007). However, congruence 
between an individual’s cognitive style and the mode induced by task properties will 
result in better outcomes (Friedman et al., 1985). For example, Brigham et al. (2007) 
found that owner-managers whose cognitive style matched the decision-making structure 
of their organization were more satisfied and had fewer intentions to exit the business. 
Although the authors did not attempt to measure the success of the organization, it can be 
inferred that those who did not want to exit the business was likely more successful. 
 Based on the aforementioned findings, I propose that there is a difference between 
the individuals whose inherent cognitive style match the employee selection method 
compared to those whose cognitive style does not match the employee selection method. 
Furthermore, since a match between the cognitive style and the cognitive strategy may 
produce better outcomes, I propose that those whose cognitive style match the employee 
selection method will perform better than those whose cognitive style does not match the 
employee selection method. Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: For complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is greater when 
the selection method is aligned with the interviewer’s cognitive style. 
 
54 
 
 
 
Effect of Procedural Accountability on Expert Intuition 
The secondary research question of this paper is: how does procedural 
accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s intuitive judgment? Consequently, as 
illustrated in Figure 6, the next hypothesis focuses on the impact of procedural 
accountability on expert intuition.  
Figure 6 
Conceptual Model for Hypothesis 4 
   
Individuals gain expert intuition when they have extensive domain-relevant 
knowledge and experience (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Expert intuition can lead to effective 
decisions when (1) the task is complex (Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004), and when 
(2) the task environment has a high level of uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, time 
pressure, lack of data, and/or more than one reasonable solution (Agor, 1986; Burke & 
Miller, 1999). While such conditions are often conducive to expert intuition, we have 
little knowledge of organizational factors that could potentially disrupt expert intuition.  
Phrases such as “paralysis by analysis” (Langley, 1995) suggest that over-
analyzing and searching for structure might adversely affect intuitive judgment (Shapiro 
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& Spence, 1997). Given that intuition is an unconscious (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005) 
and automatic process (Kahneman, 2003), I suggest that when individuals consciously 
and deliberately evaluate their decisions, their intuitive process may be obstructed. In 
fact, increased analysis of one’s own decision-making process has been found to disrupt 
task execution and lead to decreased performance (Baumeister, 1984; Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991). This is especially true for domain experts as studies in clinical decision-
making (Wimmers et al., 2005), motor skills (e.g., Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock et al., 
2002; Gray, 2004), and verbal overshadowing (e.g., Melcher & Schooler, 2004) have 
found deliberate, analytical cognitive processing to inhibit expert intuition.  
What could cause an expert to forgo their intuition and rely on deliberate, 
analytical cognitive processing? One such potential organizational factor is the 
requirement to account for the decision. Specifically, procedural accountability may 
induce analytical thinking. In support, research has found procedural accountability to 
increase the attentiveness of the decision maker to the decision-making process (e.g., 
Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002) leading to a more extensive analysis of information (e.g., 
Doney & Armstrong, 1996). Therefore, I argue that when decision makers are aware they 
will have to account for the process used to make their decision, they will use more 
deliberate, analytical thought processes. 
 As noted, these deliberate, analytical thought processes may disrupt intuitive 
thinking (Baumeister, 1984; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). This disruption of the intuitive 
process may have a positive effect on an individual with limited expertise who does not 
have the necessary domain-relevant knowledge and experience to have developed expert 
intuition. Therefore, a beginner’s intuitive decision is likely based on non-relevant 
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criteria and will typically result in a sub-optimal decision. For example, through an 
experimental study, Brtek and Motowidlo (2002) found procedural accountability to 
increase decision quality in employee selection by driving the decision maker to be more 
attentive (i.e., deliberate and analytical) to the process. The participants of the experiment 
were undergraduate students who simulated employment interviews by watching 
videotapes of managers answering an interview question and then rated the managers on 
their leadership potential. The students had very little, if any, domain-relevant experience 
to judge the leadership potential of a manager. These findings support the arguments that 
(1) procedural accountability leads to deliberate and analytical thinking, and (2) 
deliberate, analytical thinking allows a novice to increase decision quality. 
Unlike novices, in a context conducive to intuitive decision-making, experts have 
the ability to make effective intuitive decisions (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973a; Dane et al., 
2012; Dijkstra et al, 2013; Hammond et al., 1987). Contrary to the effects on novices, 
disrupting an expert’s intuitive thinking process by inducing them to use more deliberate, 
analytical thinking can negatively affect decision quality. For example, Dane et al. (2012) 
found that experts who were asked to analytically solve a task performed worse than 
those who used intuition. Furthermore, Wimmers et al. (2005) found that experts’ recall 
diminished when they were required to use a more analytical thought process.  
Given the above, it is expected that procedural accountability induces deliberate, 
analytical thought processes that disrupt intuitive thinking and, as a result, can adversely 
affect an expert’s decision quality. Likewise, I argue that in a context conducive to 
intuitive decision-making, procedural accountability will negatively impact the 
effectiveness of expert intuition. Thus, I hypothesize:   
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Hypothesis 4: For complex jobs, procedural accountability will moderate the 
positive relationship between an expert’s intuitive processes and the accuracy of 
a hiring decision such that the relationship is weaker (less positive) when 
decision-makers are required to account for the quality of the procedure used in 
making their decisions 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter includes a discussion of the research methodology used to examine 
the hypotheses listed in Chapter 2. The hypotheses were tested via a two-part 
experimental study. The first part addressed hypotheses 1-3 while the second part 
addressed hypothesis 4. In both, participants assumed the role of an interviewer charged 
with the task of employee selection for a complex job. Participants in this role reviewed 
10 pairs of candidate interviews, and for each pair, decided which one of the two 
candidate responses was a better choice. This process of a forced choice is a similar 
methodological approach as that used by Kausel et al., (2016). Following completion of 
the task, participants completed a questionnaire that assessed their cognitive style, the 
success of experimental manipulations, and collected demographic information such as 
age and gender. Both the experiment and the ensuing questionnaire were administered 
electronically via Qualtrics.  
Participants and Setting 
The healthcare staffing industry was selected as the job setting as it amply 
demonstrates the previously described criteria for job complexity. Healthcare staffing 
companies recruit and place healthcare professionals (e.g., nurses, physicians, 
pharmacists, speech and language pathologists, and other types of therapists) at various 
healthcare facilities (e.g., hospitals). Due to the complex nature of healthcare, the role of 
a healthcare professional typically involves a high level of ambiguity and complexity.
59 
 
 
 
The participants for the expert sample were those with healthcare recruiting 
experience within the United States (N = 79, 47 females, average age = 33 years, average 
healthcare recruiting experience was between 1 and 3 years). These recruiters are 
responsible for recruiting healthcare professionals and typically go through extensive 
training on recruiting in this field. Not only do the recruiters have to ensure that the 
candidates sufficiently meet the job requirements, but they also have to evaluate other 
factors such as the candidate’s past job performance as well as their current availability, 
flexibility, cultural fit, seriousness about taking a new position, and monetary 
expectations. Through this complex recruiting process, recruiters are expected to identify 
any irregularities in the candidate’s profile. In addition to these experts, a group of non-
experts without recruiting experience were also sampled. The non-expert sample 
consisted of undergraduate students from several universities in the southeast United 
States (N = 83, 41 females, average age = 20 years). This method of using an expert and 
non-expert sample is consistent with prior studies that explore the effect of interviewer 
expertise on decision accuracy (e.g., Maurer, 2002). All participants were offered the 
opportunity to participate in a raffle for four $50 Starbucks gift cards.  
Development of Interview Questions and Responses 
The preliminary step of the experimental design was to create the interview 
questions that were used for the study. Interview questions were developed following 
methods similar to prior employment interview related studies (e.g., Campion, Campion, 
& Hudson, 1994; Campion, Pursell, & Brown 1988; Day & Carroll, 2003; DeGroot & 
Kluemper, 2007; Maurer, 2002; Maurer & Lee, 2000; Pulakos et al., 1995; Weekley & 
Gier, 1987).  First, the critical incident technique was used to identify behaviors that 
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affect job performance. The critical incident technique involves the systematic process of 
collecting direct observations of behavior to assist in solving practical problems and 
developing broad psychological principals (Flanagan, 1954). Specifically, 210 behaviors 
of healthcare professionals that lead to a successful hire were identified by interviewing 
another sample of healthcare recruiters. Once the critical incidents were gathered, the 
author, who has over 11 years of experience in healthcare recruiting, reviewed and sorted 
the incidents into groups of similar incidents to form underlying job dimensions. Through 
this process, 12 job dimensions were identified (see Table 2). To assess the accuracy of 
the categorization, an expert sample of three healthcare recruiters (average healthcare 
recruiting experience = seven years) were asked to review and match a sample of the 
critical incidents to its corresponding job dimension. There was 100 percent agreement 
among the expert sample that the behaviors were appropriately categorized into job 
dimensions. 
Table 2 
Job Dimensions 
1) Attention to Detail 
2) Attitude 
3) Dependability 
4) Communication 
5) Client Focus 
6) Flexibility 
7) Honesty 
8) Planning and Organization 
9) Professionalism 
10) Responsiveness 
11) Skill and Experience 
12) Interpersonal Skills 
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Next, situational interview questions were written for 11 of the 12 identified job 
dimensions. The “skill and experience” dimension was excluded because an interview 
question that measures skill and experience will need to be specific to a particular 
healthcare profession (e.g., a nurse would need to be asked a different question than a 
speech therapist). Since the goal was to create general interview questions that apply to a 
range of healthcare professionals, this dimension was eliminated. The expert sample was 
asked to match the interview questions to job dimensions in order to assess how well the 
interview questions reflect the job dimensions. Agreement that the interview questions 
accurately represent the job dimensions ranged from 66.67 percent to 100 percent with 
the average being 90 percent. 
Then, for each question, three responses were scripted: 1) a good response, 2) an 
average response, and 3) a poor response. In order to assess the accuracy of the ranking 
order of the scripted responses, the expert sample was given the three responses for each 
question in random order and was asked to rank them based on the quality of the response 
to the interview question. The experts were also asked to determine how well the 
responses represent realistic candidate responses. Consistent with Maurer and Lee (2000) 
and Maurer (2002), a minimum acceptable level of agreement for sorting decisions is 66 
percent. Thus, adjustments to the interview questions and responses were made until a 
minimum of 66 percent agreement was achieved (the agreement for some questions were 
as low as 33 percent on the initial ranking exercise). The final agreement of the ranking 
of the candidate responses to each interview question ranged from 66.67 percent to 100 
percent with the average being 80 percent. Figure 7 illustrates the interview questions and 
responses development process. 
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Overall, out of the 11 interview questions, 10 were selected for the experiment 
along with the “good” and the “average” candidate response for each question (See 
Appendix A). The question that was eliminated was the one that reflected “interpersonal 
skills”. This is because, compared to the other questions, this question measured a more 
generic trait that may not be specific to healthcare staffing.  
With regard to the interview question and answer scripts, even though there was 
acceptable agreement among the expert sample on which candidate response is the best in 
each interview scenario, similar levels of agreement were not obtained from a different 
sample of healthcare recruiting experts (N = 5, average healthcare recruiting experience = 
13 years) who later reviewed the audio recordings of the candidate responses in the same 
format as the study participants. Thus, the interview questions and answers were further 
edited and re-tested using a sample of four healthcare recruiting experts (average 
healthcare recruiting experience = nine years). The candidate responses were adjusted 
until a minimum of three out of the four experts agreed on which was the better candidate 
response for every interview scenario.  
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Figure 7 
Interview Questions and Responses Development Process 
 
Development of Interview Recordings 
As previously described, the target setting for the present study is the healthcare 
staffing industry. Since most staffing companies in this specific industry work on a 
national scale, it is neither geographically nor economically feasible to conduct in-person 
interviews with every candidate. As a result, candidate interviews are typically conducted 
by phone. Therefore, in order to create a realistic interview environment, all the scripted 
candidate responses were audio recordings. Phone interviews apply to other industries as 
well since many professional organizations will conduct a phone interview at some point 
Expert review to assess the accuracy and realism of responses
Develop 3 responses for each question: 1) good, 2) average, 3) poor
Expert review to ensure the questions accurately represent the job dimensions
Develop interview questions for each job dimension category
Expert review to assess accuracy of critical incident categorization
Three healthcare recruiters (average experience = 7)
Group similar critical incidents to form job dimension categories:
12 job dimensions were identified (10 dimensions selected for the study)
Identify critical incidents through employee Interviews:
210 critical incidents 
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during the interview process, so ultimately, the results of this study should be 
generalizable to a broader population than just healthcare.     
Using the previously developed interview questions and responses, 10 candidate 
interview scenarios were developed. For each scenario, two candidate responses (i.e., 
good and an average response) were recorded for a total of 20 audio recordings. Only one 
question per interview scenario, as opposed to several questions, was used for two 
reasons. The first reason was to control experiment length. Since the target participants 
include working professionals, a lengthy experiment may result in decreased participation 
and task completion. The second reason was to offer a reasonable number of decision 
scenarios so that the participants’ decision accuracy score was based on multiple hiring 
decisions (i.e., 10) and not based on a single decision. Prior interview related studies have 
also used a single interview question (e.g., Brtek & Motowidlo, 2002). 
As noted, each interview scenario was developed where, for the same interview 
question, one candidate response was good and the other was average. The good-average 
response format was used because, if a pair of interviews consists of a good-poor 
response, the difference between the candidates may be easily recognizable and 
consequently, selecting the better choice may be relatively easy. In contrast, the 
difference between a good and an average response is less recognizable, which then 
makes the choice more complex. Therefore, the good-average response format was used 
to reduce the contrast effect. 
Five different actors were used for the 20 voice recordings. Care was taken to 
ensure that each actor had an equal number of recordings (i.e., four recordings each) and 
an equal number of good and average responses (i.e., two good responses and two 
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average responses). In addition, the same pair of actors did not appear in more than one 
interview scenario (i.e., the 10 interview scenarios had different combinations of actors). 
 To check for potential cueing effects due to the voice differences of the actors and 
technical aspects of the audio recordings, a sample of 11 doctoral students at a 
southeastern university were asked to rate each of the 20 voice recordings on three 
aspects – clarity, volume, and understandability. Similar to Maurer and Lee (2000) and 
Maurer (2002), the raters used a five-point Likert scale to note their level of agreement 
for each aspect (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). One-way analysis of 
variance found significant differences between the five actors for each of the three 
aspects [clarity: F(4, 215) = 8.92, p < .01; volume: F(4, 215) = 4.37, p < .01; 
understandability: F(4, 215) = 21.08, p < .01]. Post hoc analysis revealed one actor’s 
voice to be problematic. Thus, the candidate responses initially recorded using the 
problematic voice was re-recorded with a new voice. 
An updated survey of the 20 voice recordings with the changed voice was sent to 
another sample of current and former doctoral students at a southeastern university. The 
survey was completed by 11 respondents. For those voice actors that remained the same, 
the data from the first sample was combined with the data from the second sample. One-
way analysis of variance revealed significant differences among the voice actors for two 
of the three measured aspects [clarity: F(4, 391) = 3.24, p < .01; volume: F(4, 391) = 
1.57, p = .18; understandability: F(4, 391) = 4.697, p < .01]. Based on these results, it 
was determined that the best way to control for voice differences is to use a single voice 
for all 20 recordings. Thus, the candidate responses were re-recorded using a single 
female voice.       
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Study: Part One 
Participants and Setting 
As previously noted, the setting was the healthcare staffing industry. The 
participants for the expert sample were recruiters employed by healthcare staffing 
companies that have operations within the United States. For the expert sample, the 
online experiment was distributed using email and LinkedIn messages. The non-expert 
sample was undergraduate students from several southeastern universities. For the non-
experts, the online experiment was distributed by their class instructor via a link in an 
email.  
Both the experts and non-experts were randomly assigned to either an intuitive or 
an analysis condition, thereby creating four experimental groups [i.e., expert-intuition (N 
= 32; expert-analysis (N = 24); non-expert-intuition (N = 42); non-expert-analysis (N = 
41)]. The number of participants in the expert groups in the present study exceeds the 
samples used in some prior studies that use a similar methodological approach (e.g., Dane 
et al., 2012).  
For example, Dane et al. (2012) conducted two studies to test the effect of 
expertise in making intuitive versus analytical decisions when solving a complex task. 
The task in study one involved determining the difficulty of basketball shots and in study 
two, identifying authentic versus fake designer handbags. All participants in both studies 
were undergraduate business students. The total expert sample in study one was 30 
(between both the intuition and analysis conditions) and the total expert sample in study 
two was 25 (between both the intuition and analysis conditions). Authors do not specify 
the breakdown of experts in the intuition versus analysis conditions in both studies. Given 
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the total number of experts across both conditions (i.e., 30 in study one and 25 in study 
two) it can be inferred that each condition (i.e., intuition and analysis) had less than 20 
participants in each of the two studies. Comparatively, each of the experimental 
conditions in the present study has a higher number of experts (i.e., N = 32 in expert-
intuition and N = 24 in expert-analysis). In addition, each of the expert and non-experts 
groups exceeds the minimum number of 20 participants per experimental condition 
suggested by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010).     
Task and Procedure 
Participants were asked to assume the role of an interviewer charged with the task 
of employee selection for a complex job (i.e., healthcare professionals). They were 
exposed to the 10 interview scenarios, and in each scenario, were asked to select the best 
response out of two candidate responses to the same interview question. While an 
alternate method could have been to ask the participants to rate the candidate responses to 
the interview questions without having to make a selection, in a typical employment 
selection context, interviewers are required to make a selection. Therefore, a forced 
choice between the candidates represented a more realistic employment selection 
situation. As a decision aid, for all interview questions, the participants were given the 
job dimension that was being assessed along with the definition of that job dimension 
(see Appendix B for a sample interview scenario as presented to the participants). 
The experiment was administered electronically using Qualtrics survey software. 
The participants completed the task on their computers, and in the case of most of the 
expert sample, at their work desks. This method induced a natural work environment as 
the phone interviews are generally conducted at the recruiters’ desks. After the 10 
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interview scenarios, all participants completed a questionnaire that assessed the quality of 
the experimental manipulation, participants’ cognitive style, gender, age, and healthcare 
recruiting experience. 
Experimental Conditions 
Similar to prior studies that explored the effect of intuition in decision-making 
(e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Pretz, 2008), both the expert and non-expert samples were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8 
Experimental Conditions 
 
Intuition Condition. Participants in the intuition condition were asked to make 
their decision solely based on their intuition, first impression, and gut feeling. Similar to 
Dane et al., (2011) and Dane et al., (2012), they were asked not to think too hard and 
were encouraged to select the first decision that came to their mind (see Appendix C for 
specific instructions).  
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Analysis Condition. In order to induce analytical reasoning, the participants in the 
analytical condition were given explicit instructions to use deliberation, logic, and 
analysis. This method of inducing analytical cognitive processing is similar to the 
methods used in the studies cited above as well as Pretz (2008). Participants were 
encouraged to ignore any first impressions and gut feelings and instead to carefully 
consider all available information prior to making a decision (see Appendix D for 
specific instructions).  
Manipulation Check 
The manipulation check evaluated whether participants in each condition 
complied with expected cognitive manipulations. For this purpose, a four-item measure 
adapted from Dane et al. (2011) was used (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
Manipulation Check – Intuition and Analysis Conditions 
 
Study: Part Two 
 The purpose of the second part of the study was to answer the last research 
question (i.e., how does procedural accountability impact the accuracy of an expert’s 
intuitive judgment?) and correspondingly, to test hypothesis 4, which predicted that 
procedural accountability will negatively impact expert intuition.  An additional sample 
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of experts placed in an intuition-procedural accountability condition was gathered and 
their decision accuracy was compared to that of individuals in the expert-intuition (no 
accountability) condition from the first part of the study.  
Participants and Setting 
Individuals in the procedural accountability condition included experienced 
healthcare recruiters (N = 23). All participants were assigned to an intuition condition. 
However, to induce procedural accountability, they were also told that they may be asked 
to explain the process they followed in making their decisions.   
Task and Procedure 
The task was consistent with the online process described earlier (i.e., they 
assumed to the role of a healthcare recruiter, reviewed the 10 interview scenarios, and for 
each scenario, selected the best candidate response).  
Experimental Condition 
All participants in the intuition-procedural accountability condition were given 
directions similar to those given to the individuals in the intuition condition in the first 
part of the study (see Appendix A).  However, unlike those in the intuition condition, 
they were told that, at the end of the experiment, they will be required to justify the 
procedure they followed in making their decisions (see Appendix E for instructions). As 
depicted in Figure 9, the intuition-procedural accountability sample was then compared to 
the expert-intuition sample in study one. 
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Figure 9 
Accountability Experimental Conditions 
  
Manipulation Check 
At the end of the task, participants were asked to complete a manipulation check 
to evaluate if they complied with the manipulations. To assess this, the study adapted 
measures used by Dane et al. (2011) and Brtek and Motowidlo (2002). Table 4 details 
this five-item measure.  
Table 4 
Manipulation Check – Procedural Accountability and Intuition Conditions 
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Measures 
Decision Accuracy 
As previously noted, the dependent variable is the accuracy of a hiring decision 
for a complex job. Accuracy was measured by calculating the number of times each 
participant selected the best candidate response in each of the 10 interview scenarios. 
Thus, the accuracy score could range from 0 (i.e., did not select the best candidate 
response in any of the interview scenarios) to 10 (selected the best candidate response in 
all of the interview scenarios).  
In order to ensure the dependent variable was a valid measure of decision 
accuracy, three steps were followed. First, the candidate responses were intentionally 
written to have one candidate response stronger than the other. Second, the interview 
scenario scripts were given to four healthcare recruiting experts (average healthcare 
recruiting experience = nine years) to determine if there is a high level of agreement 
among the experts on which candidate response is better in each of the 10 interview 
scenarios. The candidate responses were adjusted until a minimum of three out of the 
four experts agreed on which was the better candidate response for every scenario. 
Third, after the audio recordings were completed, five healthcare recruiting 
experts (average healthcare recruiting experience = 12 years) viewed the interview 
scenarios and listened to the candidate responses in the same online format as the 
participants would be expected to do in the subsequent study. This sample of expert raters 
did not include any of the experts that previously reviewed the interview scenario scripts. 
In addition to providing a definition of each job dimension, the expert raters were given 
the characteristics of a good response for every interview question. They were then 
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tasked to select the best candidate response in each of the 10 interview scenarios. As 
illustrated in Table 5, there was a high level of agreement among experts. Therefore, it 
was determined that in the full study, a participant’s accuracy score would be calculated 
as the number of times they selected the candidate response that was consistent with the 
best response identified by the experts in the pre-test.    
Table 5 
Expert Agreement on Best Candidate Response 
Interview Scenario Percentage of agreement 
on the best candidate 
response 
1) Attention to Detail 100 
2) Attitude 100 
3) Dependability 100 
4) Communication 80 
5) Client Focus 100 
6) Flexibility 100 
7) Honesty 80 
8) Planning and Organization 80 
9) Professionalism 100 
10) Responsiveness 100 
N = 5 
Cognitive Style 
 Consistent with the dual process view of information processing, and following 
Dane et al. (2011), Pretz (2008), and Pretz and Totz (2007), cognitive style was measured 
using the rational-experiential-inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The instrument 
includes a 10-item measure of rational engagement (i.e., preference for analysis) and a 
10-item measure of experiential engagement (i.e., preference for intuition). Each item had 
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responses ranging from 1 (definitely not true of myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself). 
Each item is provided in Table 6 below. 
Table 6 
Rational-Experiential-Inventory 
Rational Engagement Scale 
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something  (-) 
I enjoy intellectual challenges 
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking (-) 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking 
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity (-) 
I prefer complex problems to simple problems 
Thinking hard and for a long time about something  gives me little satisfaction 
(-) 
I enjoy thinking in abstract terms 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is 
good enough for me (-) 
Learning new ways to think will be very appealing to me  
Experiential Engagement Scale 
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions 
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action  
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition (-) 
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition 
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings (-) 
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions  
(-) 
I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions (-) 
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself  as 
intuitive (-)  
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions 
Response range: 1= definitely not true of myself, 5= definitely true of myself 
(-) = reverse scored item 
Adapted from Pacini and Epstein (1999) 
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Domain Expertise 
 As previously noted, the selection of an expert and non-expert sample was 
deliberate. The expert sample included those who have prior experience in healthcare 
recruiting. Compared to an individual with no formal training and experience in the field, 
a healthcare recruiter who has at least completed the new-hire training process would 
already possess a reasonable amount of knowledge on how to accurately qualify a 
healthcare professional. For the non-expert sample, the participants were individuals with 
no healthcare recruiting experience.  
Gender 
 Prior studies have found gender affected how individuals process information 
(e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Epstein et al., 1996). Therefore, consistent with Dane et 
al. (2011), Dane et al. (2012), and Norris and Epstein (2011), this study controlled for 
gender.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the data and the analysis 
pertaining to testing the hypotheses. First, preliminary analysis such as outliers, the 
normality of dependent variable, manipulation checks, cognitive style, and group 
differences due to the control variable (i.e., gender) is discussed. The results of the 
hypotheses testing are then presented.  
Outliers 
 As an initial step in examining the data, outlier analysis was conducted in order to 
eliminate any effects due to observations that are distinctly different from the general 
sample. An evaluation of the data set revealed six participants who displayed 
inconsistencies in how they responded to survey questions. These respondents were 
deemed problematic and were removed. After eliminating those participants, as depicted 
in Figure 10, two other potential outliers were recognized. Upon further review, it was 
identified that both of the potential outliers were in the non-expert group and scored 2 out 
of 10. Since non-experts do not have healthcare recruiting experience, these scores were 
not surprising and cannot be considered outliers per se. Therefore, no further outliers 
were removed. 
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Figure 10 
Outliers 
 
Normality of the Dependent Variable 
Next, the normality of the dependent variable was assessed. The skewness (-.730) 
and kurtosis (.457) were within acceptable levels of + or – 1.96 at the .05 error level (Hair 
et al., 2010). Therefore, the dependent measure sufficiently meets the assumption of 
normality which is a requisite for the analytical methods used in the present study.  
Manipulations 
 As previously detailed, participants were exposed to three experimental 
conditions: 1) intuition, 2) analysis, and 3) intuition-procedural-accountability. Experts 
and non-experts were assigned to both intuition and analysis conditions, which resulted in 
four groups: 1) expert-intuition, 2) non-expert-intuition, 3) expert-analysis, and 4) non-
expert-analysis. In addition, for the second part of the study, a sample of experts was 
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assigned to the intuition-procedural-accountability condition resulting in an expert-
intuition-procedural accountability group.   
In order to induce the desired condition, participants in each experimental 
condition were given specific instructions on how to make their decisions (see Appendix 
C, D, and E). An analysis of the manipulation check questions was conducted to 
determine if the participants complied with these manipulations. Previous experimental 
studies have shown that some participants may fail to comply with instructions (e.g., 
Pretz, 2008). Therefore, to increase the accuracy of the final results, it is important to 
examine the data to ensure that only the participants that satisfactorily complied with the 
manipulation are included in hypotheses testing. To this end, in the present study, 
participants in each of the experimental groups were analyzed in order to eliminate those 
that did not adhere to the manipulations.  
Specifically, participants were given a four-item questionnaire to check if they 
complied with the instructions. Two of those statements measured intuitive strategy (i.e., 
“I selected the first choice that came to my mind”, “I relied on my gut instinct”) while 
two measured analytical strategy (i.e., “I made my decisions in a logical and systematic 
way”, “I analyzed all available information in detail”). In addition to the four 
aforementioned statements, individuals in the expert-intuition-procedural-accountability 
group were given an additional question to measure if they felt accountable for the 
decision-making procedure (i.e., “Did you think you would have to explain the process 
you followed in selecting the best candidate response?”). All items were measured using 
a 7-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
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 In the expert-intuition group, two participants were eliminated that selected 
“neither disagree nor agree” to both intuition manipulation check statements. One 
participant was deleted who selected “somewhat disagree” to the “I relied on my gut 
instinct” statement. Seven participants who didn’t agree with the “I selected the first 
choice that came to my mind” statement but agreed with “I relied on my gut instinct” 
statement was retained. This is because, although intuition is generally considered fast, 
there is some debate as to whether intuition is always fast (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Thus, 
although those seven participants did not select the first choice, they agreed that they 
used their intuition by using “gut instinct” to make decisions. The final number of 
participants in the expert-intuition group was 32.  
In the non-expert-intuition group, one participant was eliminated who selected 
“neither disagree nor agree” to both intuition manipulation check statements. Three 
participants were eliminated who did not agree with the “I relied on my gut instinct” 
statement. Six participants who did not agree with the “I selected the first choice that 
came to my mind” statement but agreed with the “I relied on my gut instinct” statement 
was retained due to the reasons previously stated. The final number of participants in the 
non-expert-intuition condition was 42.     
 In the expert-analysis group, with the exception of one, all participants who 
completed the experiment agreed with the manipulation check statements. The one 
exception selected “neither disagree nor agree” to “I analyzed all available information in 
detail” and agreed with the “I made my decisions in a logical and systematic way” 
statement. Since the participant agreed with at least one statement and was neutral to the 
other, there is sufficient evidence that the analytical condition was induced. Thus, the 
80 
 
 
 
response was retained. The final number of participants in the expert-analysis condition 
was 24.  
In the non-expert-analysis group, six participants were eliminated because they 
did not agree with either one or both analysis manipulation check statements. Three were 
retained who were neutral (i.e., selected “neither disagree nor agree”) to “I analyzed all 
available information in detail” but agreed with the “I made my decisions in a logical and 
systematic way” statement. All other participants agreed with both statements. As a 
result, 41 participants in the non-expert-analysis condition were used in the final analysis.  
In the expert-intuition-procedural-accountability group, 14 participants were 
eliminated as they did not agree that they felt accountable for the procedure used in 
making their decisions. Thus, 23 participants were used in the final analysis.  
 To further evaluate if the intuition and analysis manipulations were successful, 
univariate analysis of variance was used on the four manipulation check statements. As 
depicted in Table 7, the tests revealed a significant difference between the conditions on 
how they responded to each of the four manipulation check statements. For the two 
statements that measured if the intuition condition was induced, ratings of the participants 
in the intuition condition (M = 5.66, SD = 1.30 and M = 6.00, SD = .79 respectively) were 
significantly higher than the participants in the analysis condition [M = 2.89, SD = 1.48, 
F(1,137) = 138.40 , p < .01, η2 = .50 and M = 3.40, SD = 1.58, F(1,137) = 233.93 , p < 
.01, η2 = .53  respectively]. Similarly, For the two statements that measured if the 
analysis condition was induced, ratings of the participants in the analysis condition (M = 
6.14, SD = .77 and M = 6.12, SD = .86 respectively) were significantly higher than the 
participants in the intuition condition [M = 5.66, SD = 1.37, F(1,137) = 7.85, p < .05, η2 = 
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.04 and M = 5.41, SD = 1.57, F(1,137) = 10.76, p < .01, η2 = .07 respectively]. Based on 
these results, it was concluded that the manipulations were successful.  
Table 7 
ANOVA Results for Manipulation Check Statements 
 Mean 
Intuition 
Condition 
N = 74 
Mean 
Analysis 
Condition 
N = 65 
F  
(1, 137) 
I selected the first choice that came to my mind 5.66 2.89 138.40** 
I relied on my gut instinct 6.00 3.40 233.93** 
I made my decisions in a logical and systematic way 5.66 6.14 7.85* 
I analyzed all available information in detail 5.41 6.12 10.76** 
** p < .01, *p < .05    
 
Cognitive Style 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to determine if the Rational-
Experiential-Inventory items fit a two-factor model [i.e., rational (analytical) and 
experiential (intuitive)] as posited by the dual-process theory. An image of the initial 
measurement model (X2 = 421.91) is provided in Figure 11. After the model was 
specified and estimated, multiple indices were examined to determine model fit. As 
reported in Table 8, the initial model did not meet acceptable fit per guidelines provided 
by Hair et al. (2010). 
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Figure 11 
Initial Measurement Model 
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Table 8 
Initial Measurement Model Fit Results    
Fit Index Desired Initial Model Final Model 
Chi-Square/Degrees of 
Freedom (CMIN/DF) 
Below 2 preferred; 2-
5 acceptable 
2.50 1.58 
Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) 
> .90 .70 .96 
Root Mean Square 
Error of 
Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
< .08 .10 .07 
Note: N = 139; Desired guidelines based on Hair et al. (2010) 
 
Thus, following recommended guidelines by Hair et al. (2010) items were 
eliminated one at a time until the model met acceptable fit (X2 = 53.87, CMIN/DF = 1.58, 
CFI = .96, RMSEA = .07). In total, ten items with factor loadings less than .5 were 
eliminated. The final model had six items for the rational scale and four items for the 
experiential scale (see Table 9). Past research has found some evidence that the 
experiential scale may not be entirely unidimensional, but rather measure different 
aspects of intuition such as affective and automatic intuition (Pretz & Totz, 2007). This 
may account for the low factor loadings of many experiential scale items. However, even 
though the experiential scale was reduced to four items, based on a review of the 
wordings (i.e., face validity), it was determined that the items that were left captured the 
preference for intuitive decision-making sufficiently well.  
All factor loadings of the final model were above the .5 standard noted by Hair et 
al. (2010) (see Table 9). Although the average variance extracted (AVE) for the two 
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constructs were slightly lower than .5 (rational = .48 and experiential .45), the composite 
reliabilities were greater than the .7 recommended standard (rational = .84, experiential = 
.76) by Hair et al. (2010). Per Fornell and Larcker (1981), a researcher may conclude 
adequate convergent validity based on reliability even though the average variance 
extracted is less than 50 percent. Thus, considering that composite reliability meets 
acceptable standards and all factor loading were above .5, it was determined that the 
model meets acceptable convergent validity.  
To assess discriminant validity, the AVE was compared to the squared 
interconstruct correlation (SIC = .03) between the two factors. Since the AVEs for both 
constructs was greater than the SIC, discriminant validity was achieved. The Cronbach’s 
alphas for the final rational (.84) and experiential (.74) engagement scales were above the 
minimum acceptable level of .7 noted by Hair et al. (2010). Consequently, the items for 
each scale on the final model were averaged to form two indices (i.e., intuitive and 
analytical) for cognitive style.   
Table 9 
Final Items: Rational-Experiential Inventory 
Rational Engagement Scale Factor 
Loadings 
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something  (-) .72 
I enjoy intellectual challenges .57 
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking (-) .86 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking .62 
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity (-) .74 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it 
is good enough for me (-) .58 
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Experiential Engagement Scale  
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions .59 
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems .63 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action  .89 
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions .51 
Response range: 1= definitely not true of myself, 5= definitely true of 
myself 
 
(-) = reverse scored item  
 
Differences Due to Gender 
Since prior studies have found gender to affect how individuals process 
information (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Epstein et al., 1996), gender was used as a 
control variable. Univariate analysis of variance was used to measure differences in the 
decision accuracy score (i.e. dependent variable) based on gender. The test revealed a 
marginally significant difference between the groups due to gender [F(1, 160) = 3.11, p = 
.08]. Although some prior studies that controlled for gender have found a significant 
difference between gender and task performance (e.g., Dane et al., 2012, study 1), some 
have not (e.g., Dane et al., 2012, study 2). Thus, gender was controlled in the analysis of 
the present study. 
Building on these results, the next section discusses the analysis and the findings 
of the hypothesis testing. Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables are 
provided in Table 10.    
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Experiential Engagement (Intuitive) 3.56 0.68 
_ 
    
2. Rational Engagement (Analytical) 4.21 0.71 -0.15 
_ 
   
3. Decision Accuracy Score 7.17 1.62 -0.14 0.32** 
_ 
  
4. Expertise 0.49 0.50 0.08 0.30** 0.24** 
_ 
 
5. Gender 0.52 0.50 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.15 
_ 
Note: N = 162; Expertise (0 = Non-expert, 1 = Expert); Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female);  
 ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
  
Hypotheses Testing 
 Hypothesis 1 proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is 
greater when the decision makers use an intuitive rather than an analytical decision-
making process. Thus, to test this hypothesis, the decision accuracy score of those who 
were in the intuition condition (N = 74, M = 6.91, SD = 1.75) was compared to those who 
were in the analysis condition (N = 65, M = 7.25, SD = 1.47). Contrary to the hypothesis, 
at an absolute level, the mean of those in the analysis condition was, in fact, higher than 
those in the intuition condition. However, univariate analysis of variance showed no 
significant difference between the conditions [F(1, 135) = 1.568, p = .21). Therefore, 
hypothesis 1 was not supported.  
 Hypothesis 2a proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is 
greater when the interviewer is an expert and the interviewer uses intuitive rather than 
analytical decision processes. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the expert-
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intuition (N = 32, M = 7.56, SD = 1.22) and expert-analysis groups (N = 24, M = 7.37, SD 
= 1.56). Although at an absolute level the expert-intuition group scored higher than the 
expert-analysis group, univariate analysis of variance showed no significant differences 
between the groups [F(1, 52) = .075, p = .76]. Thus, hypothesis 2a was not supported.  
 Hypothesis 2b proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is 
greater when the decision maker using intuitive selection processes is an expert rather 
than a non-expert. To test this hypothesis, the expert-intuition group (N = 32, M = 7.56, 
SD = 1.22) was compared to the non-expert-intuition group (N = 42, M = 6.40, SD = 
1.93). Univariate analysis of variance showed a significant difference between the groups 
[F(1, 70) = 6.98, p < .01, η2 = .09], thus confirming the hypothesis that experts perform 
better using intuition than non-experts. In contrast, when the expert-analysis (N = 24, M = 
7.37, SD = 1.56) and the non-expert analysis (N = 41, M = 7.17, SD = 1.43) groups were 
compared, there was no significant difference in decision accuracy [F(1, 61) = .25, p = 
.62]. These findings suggest that even through expertise may increase the effectiveness of 
intuitive decision-making, expertise may not make a difference when it comes to 
analytical decision-making. The findings are consistent with Dane et al. (2012) who 
found expertise to amplify the effectiveness of intuitive decisions and not analytical 
decisions.    
 Hypothesis 3 proposed that for complex jobs, the accuracy of a hiring decision is 
greater when the selection method (i.e., intuitive versus analytical) is aligned with the 
interviewer’s cognitive style. In order to test this hypothesis, it was imperative to identify 
those whose cognitive style matched and those whose cognitive style did not match the 
employee selection method. This was accomplished using the following method. First, 
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the items of the corrected model for each of the rational and experiential measures were 
averaged to form two indices [i.e., 1) mean score for each participant on the rational scale 
and 2) mean score of each participant on the experiential scale]. Then, similar to Pretz 
(2008), those above the median for each index was categorized as high in intuitive 
(median = 3.75) or analytical (median = 4.33) style, and those at or below the median 
were categorized as low in intuitive or analytical style (high was coded 1 and low was 
coded 0). This resulted in two additional indices (i.e., one with high and low in intuitive 
style and the other with high and low in analytical style). Using these indices, those 
whose cognitive style matched the selection method (e.g., those in the intuition condition 
who were also high in intuitive style) were coded 1 and those whose cognitive style did 
not match the selection method (e.g., those in the intuition condition who were low in 
intuitive style) were coded 0.  Univariate analysis of variance showed no significant 
difference [F(1, 135) = .08, p = .78] between those whose cognitive style matched the 
selection method (N = 66, M = 7.12, SD = 1.79) and those whose cognitive style did not 
match the selection method (N = 73, M = 7.01, SD = 1.48). Thus, hypothesis 3 was not 
supported.  
 Hypothesis 4 proposed that for complex jobs, procedural accountability will 
decrease an expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive decision. To test this 
hypothesis, the expert-intuition group (N = 32, M = 7.56, SD = 1.22) was compared to the 
expert-intuition-procedural-accountability group (N = 23, M = 7.78, SD = 1.45). 
Univariate analysis of variance showed that there was no significant difference [F(1, 51) 
= .46, p = .50] between the groups based on their decision accuracy score. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4 was not supported.   
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 In summary, the results of the analysis indicated that hypothesis 2b, which 
proposed that expertise will increase the accuracy of an intuitive hiring decision, was 
supported. The remaining hypotheses were not supported.  
Post-Hoc Analysis 
 The findings of Dane et al. (2012) suggest that non-experts perform better using 
analysis than intuition. Therefore, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to examine if these 
findings hold true in the present study. The analysis revealed a significant difference 
[F(1, 79) = 4.15, p < .05, η2 = .05] in task performance between the non-experts in the 
analysis and intuition conditions. Univariate analysis of variance showed that the non-
experts in the analysis condition (N = 41, M = 7.17, SD = 1.43) performed better than the 
non-experts in the intuition condition (N = 42, M = 6.40, SD = 1.93). This finding 
suggests that, when the interviewers are non-experts, they are better off using an 
analytical approach as oppose to an intuitive approach to make selection decisions. The 
implications of the results are discussed in the following section.       
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The purpose of this study was to examine factors that impact the effectiveness of 
intuition in employee selection. First, the study attempted to understand if the findings of 
intuition research, that intuition can be an effective way to make decisions for complex 
tasks when the decision maker is a domain expert, hold true in an employee selection 
context. To this end, the study explored the impact of interviewer expertise on the 
accuracy of an intuitive versus analytical hiring decision when recruiting for a complex 
job. In addition, there is some evidence that individuals will make better decisions when 
their decision-making approach is aligned with their cognitive style (e.g., Brigham et al., 
Friedman et al., 1985). The present study tested if these findings extend to employee 
selection. Finally, the study examined the impact of procedural accountability on an 
expert’s ability to make an effective intuitive decision. To explore these relationships, a 
two-part experimental study was conducted using a sample of 79 expert interviewers and 
83 non-expert interviewers. The hypotheses were tested by examining group differences 
via the analysis of variance statistical method. 
Discussion 
The present study contributes to our understanding of intuition. Although scholars 
have been attempting to delineate what intuition is and when it can be used effectively, 
there has been a scarcity of research that explores the role of intuition in making real-
world organizational decisions. Specifically relating to employee selection, although
91 
 
 
 
many managers use intuition to make hiring decisions (Nowicki & Rosse, 2002), scholars 
generally scorn upon the use of intuition by highlighting the biases of the intuitive 
process (e.g., Highhouse, 2008b). However, to the author’s knowledge, there are no 
studies that empirically examine contextual factors that could impact the actual use of 
intuition in employee selection. Through a rigorous experimental design that attempted to 
capture intuitive and analytical decision-making at the point of action, this study 
addressed this limitation by examining the role of job complexity, interviewer expertise, 
cognitive style, and procedural accountability on the effectiveness of intuitive hiring 
decisions. 
This study found that, for the type of complex jobs considered in the present study 
(i.e. health care professionals), there is no significant difference between those who used 
intuition versus those who used analysis to make hiring decisions. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, those who used analysis (M = 7.25) scored a little better than those who used 
intuition (M = 6.91), albeit at an insignificant level. Upon further examination, the cause 
for this finding is the difference in task performance between experts and non-experts in 
each condition. Although experts scored marginally higher using intuition (M = 7.56) 
than analysis (M = 7.37), the non-experts scored significantly better using analysis (M = 
7.17) than intuition (M = 6.40). Thus, the combined effect of experts and non-experts in 
each condition caused those who used analysis to have a higher score than those who 
used intuition.  
The finding that there is no significant difference between using intuition or 
analysis to make hiring decisions indicates that, perhaps, for complex jobs, intuition may 
be as good as analytical judgment to make hiring decisions. Most arguments against the 
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use of intuition in employee selection are based on hiring decisions made for low 
complexity jobs (e.g., e.g., Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Levashina et 
al., 2014; Wiener & Cronshaw, 1988). Recall that a complex job was defined as a 
position that has many tacit elements that lead to successful job performance.  As such, a 
low complexity job is one that has only a few tacit elements that lead to job success 
which makes it relatively easier to determine and measure the criteria for successful job 
performance. Therefore, intuition may not be effective for low complexity jobs. 
However, as job complexity increases, studies have found the effectiveness of 
analytical techniques to diminish (Huffcutt et al., 2001; Levashina et al., 2014; Pulakos & 
Schmitt, 1995). This is because, as job complexity increases, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to determine the criteria for job success, which makes it problematic to develop 
objective measures to assess a candidate’s ability to be successful on the job. Therefore, 
analytical hiring methods may not provide a significant advantage over intuition in 
making hiring decisions for complex jobs. In fact, in the general intuition research, there 
is some evidence that intuitive decisions are better than analytical decisions when solving 
complex tasks (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004).  
In the present study, even though there was no support to indicate that intuition 
would be better than analysis, the findings do strengthen the argument that intuition may 
at least be as good as analysis to make decisions for complex jobs. Further, on a broader 
level of decision-making beyond an employee selection context, given the fast-paced 
nature of work environments, if there is no difference between intuitive and analytical 
decision-making for complex tasks, the relative speed of intuition may make it a more 
appealing option. For example, organizational managers often find themselves in 
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situations where perfect information relating to a particular business decision is not 
available or takes too much time and money to obtain. In such situations, an intuitive 
decision may be the most practical option.   
When experts are considered, the present study found that those in the analysis 
condition did not perform any better than those in the intuition condition. This finding is 
relevant to research that explores the effect of analysis on expert judgment. When 
information relevant to the decision is provided, one would expect an expert to be able to 
identify the most pertinent set of information and use that data to make a good decision. 
However, in the present study, the experts who were asked to analyze all the information 
before making a decision did not do any better than those who were asked to ignore that 
information and only use their intuition. It might be because, due to the complex 
cognitive maps that are developed through years of training, experts are able to quickly 
capture the information they need with a mere glance of the data (Chase & Simon, 
1973a). Therefore, increased focus on analyzing the data may not necessarily provide 
additional insight for experts.  
Related to the above, it should be noted that the amount of information provided 
to the participants of this study was not extensive. Accordingly, in an organizational 
decision-making environment where more information is available to the decision maker, 
it is yet to be empirically tested if experts are similarly able to quickly capture the 
relevant information to make an effective intuitive decision. This would be an interesting 
area for future research.           
The most impactful finding of the present study is that experts made better 
intuitive hiring decisions than non-experts. This finding is significant for two main 
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reasons. First, it extends the prevalent argument in intuition research (i.e., that intuition is 
an effective form of decision-making only when the decision maker is a domain expert) 
to the arena of employee selection, and in a broader context, to the prediction of human 
behavior. Thus far, most studies that empirically examine the impact of intuition has 
focused on its effect on aspects such as solving practical problems (Pretz, 2008), 
creativity (Dane et al., 2011), rating the difficulty of basketball shots, and authenticating 
designer handbags (Dane et al., 2012). In the aforementioned studies, the focus is on an 
individual’s intuitive ability to be successful in a particular task. But, the present study 
takes this a step further by examining an individual’s intuitive ability to judge another 
person’s capacity to be successful in a particular task (i.e., a job). Consequently, the 
findings suggest that not only does expertise increase one’s intuitive ability to solve a 
given task; expertise may also increase an individual’s intuitive ability to judge another 
person’s capacity to be successful in a particular task. 
Second, the result challenges the existing notion among scholars that the ability to 
make good intuitive hiring decisions does not increase with experience [referred to as the 
“myth of expertise” (Highouse, 2008b)]. As previously noted, an employee selection 
environment typically has many characteristics that are considered to be conducive to 
intuitive decision-making [i.e., uncertainty, complexity, time pressure, insufficient data, 
and multiple solution possibilities (Agor, 1986; Baldacchino et al., 2015; Burke & Miller, 
1999)]. This is especially true when recruiting for a complex job as intuition has been 
found to be effective for complex tasks (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). Given such an 
environment that is prone to effective intuitive decision-making, the general intuition 
research has shown that expertise does increase one’s ability to make effective intuitive 
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decisions (e.g., Dane et al., 2012). Therefore, the findings of the present study suggest 
that perhaps scholars were too premature in discounting the impact of expertise on 
intuitive hiring without fully understanding when it might be useful (e.g., for a complex 
job). The “myth of expertise” in employee selection may not be a myth after all.   
It is important to note that the argument here is not that we should abandon 
analytical hiring methods in favor of intuition. In fact, the experimental design of the 
present study included elements that are consistent with analytical hiring techniques: 1) 
the interview questions were developed through a laborious process following the critical 
incident technique, 2) the interview questions were situational questions which are part of 
a highly structured interview format, 3) the interviews were standardized where  both 
candidate responses were for the same interview question, and 4) decision aids were 
provided in the form of the job dimension and its definition. Therefore, the argument is 
that, when the interviewer is an expert and the job is complex, perhaps we should not 
merely rely on analytical techniques but give some weight to the interviewer’s intuitive 
judgment. 
As previously noted, Dane et al. (2012) found that non-experts performed better 
using analysis than intuition.  Although the authors did not specify if the differences were 
statistically significant, their results suggest that an analytical approach may be better for 
non-experts than an intuitive approach.  Through a post-hoc analysis, the present study 
explored whether non-experts performed significantly better when they used an analytical 
approach compared to an intuitive approach. While not originally hypothesized, this 
result may provide useful insight as to what type of decision-making approach may be 
better suited for non-experts (e.g., owners of a small family business). Because non-
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experts do not have the complex cognitive schemas that enable experts to make effective 
intuitive decisions, their intuitive judgments are often nothing more than a guess with an 
equal probability of being correct or incorrect. However, when non-experts use an 
analytical approach, even though they may not know precisely what information is 
critical to solving the problem (Pretz, 2008), the deliberate thinking process may unearth 
elements that lead them towards, or at least increase their chances of, making the correct 
decision. Therefore, when the decision maker is a non-expert, an analytical decision-
making approach may be more effective than relying on their intuition. 
With regard to the cognitive style of the decision maker, this study found that 
those whose cognitive style matched the employee selection method did not perform 
significantly better than those whose cognitive style did not match the employee selection 
method. Prior research has found that individuals prefer to use a decision-making strategy 
that is in line with their cognitive style (e.g., Chen et al., 2008, Miles & Sadler-Smith, 
2014). Although congruence between cognitive style and strategy has, in some cases, led 
to better outcomes (e.g., Brigham et al., Friedman et al., 1985), there is some evidence 
that individuals may perform better when they use a decision strategy that is opposite to 
their cognitive style (e.g., Dane et al., 2011). Further, as found in the present study, the 
association between cognitive style and decision strategy may not impact decision quality 
at all. Given these results, it seems that there may be other factors (e.g., task 
characteristics) which influence the relationship between cognitive style, decision 
strategy, and decision quality. Therefore, further exploration into contextual factors may 
be required to fully understand these relationships.  
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The second part of this study examined the impact of procedural accountability on 
expert intuition. It was hypothesized that procedural accountability will have a negative 
impact on an expert’s ability to make effective intuitive decisions. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, the experts in the procedural accountability condition (M = 7.78) did slightly 
better than those in the intuition condition (M = 7.56). However, it should be noted that 
the difference between the groups was not significant. The finding that there is no 
significant difference between the experts who were held accountable and those who 
were not held accountable suggests that, within the context of this study, there is no dark 
side to accountability. That is, within a complex organizational decision-making situation 
such as employee selection, procedural accountability does not appear to have a negative 
effect on expert intuition.   
Academic Contributions and Practical Implications 
 This study makes several important contributions to academic research. First, this 
study extends our understanding of intuition. Thus far, the conceptual development of 
intuition has been limited due to the difficulty in directly examining the intuitive process 
(Baylor, 2001). Since intuition is an unconscious, automatic, and rapid process, it is 
challenging to assess the actual use of intuition. Due to the complications in measuring 
the actual use of intuition, most studies measure one’s preference for intuitive decision-
making (Blume & Covin, 2011) or use self-reported measures that rely on retroactive 
accounts (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014; Nowicki & Rosse, 
2002, Pretz & Totz, 2007).  
 There are two issues with this methodology. One is that self-reported measures 
are susceptible to recollection bias and the other is that people tend to glorify their 
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successes while minimizing failures (Dimov, 2007). Especially because intuition is a 
nonconscious and automatic process, it is difficult to assume that people will be able to 
accurately recollect the cognitive process they used during a past event. In response, 
scholars have called for the use of experimental methods to better capture the cognitive 
process during the point of action (Baldacchino et al., 2015; Fisher, 2008; Hodgkinson & 
Clark, 2007). As detailed in the research methodology section, through a rigorous 
experimental design, this study adhered to this call by attempting to capture the actual use 
of intuition at the point of action. 
Second, there is a scarcity of applied research relating to intuition in general 
(Khatri & Ng, 2000) and intuitive prediction of behavior in particular (Highhouse & 
Kostek, 2013). More specifically, there is a lack of empirical work examining the role of 
intuition in employee selection (Highhouse & Kostek, 2013; Miles & Sadler-Smith, 
2014). Scholars have studied aspects such as the reasons an interviewer uses a particular 
cognitive strategy (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014) and the interviewer’s reaction to 
intuitive or analytical selection methods (Chen et al., 2008). However, we had little 
empirical evidence of how intuition, especially expert intuition, impacts the effectiveness 
of a hiring decision. Through the findings of the present study, we now have a better 
understanding of when intuition might be useful in employee selection (i.e., when the job 
is complex and the interviewer is an expert).  
Third, this study highlights the importance of context in employee selection 
(Colarelli & Thompson, 2008).  Scholars who argue that expert intuition is ineffective in 
employee selection tend to generalize this notion without paying close attention to 
contextual factors such as job complexity. In addition, not much is known about factors 
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that affect the validity of analytical selection methods (Huffcutt et al., 2004). As a result, 
we had limited knowledge of how contextual factors such as job complexity impact the 
effectiveness of intuitive and analytical hiring processes. The present study attempted to 
address this specific limitation by examining the impact of intuition when recruiting for 
complex jobs. Further research is required to identify other possible contextual factors 
that may impact intuitive hiring decisions. 
 Finally, scholars have called for future research to study cognition through the 
lens of dual-process theory as opposed to the unitary view (Baldacchino et al., 2015). As 
described earlier, the unitary view considers intuition and analysis to be opposite ends of 
a single continuum (e.g., Allinson & Hayes, 1996; Baylor, 1997; Simon, 1992).  Due to 
issues with measurement, it has been argued that the unitary view should be abandoned 
(Hodgkinson et al, 2009b). In contrast, the dual-process theory of cognition views 
intuition and analysis as two separate independent systems (Sadler-Smith & Burke-
Smalley, 2015). Although some of the intuitive and analytical style measurement items of 
the Rational-Experiential-Inventory were eliminated during confirmatory factor analysis, 
the scale still fit a two-factor model and there was no significant correlation between the 
two factors. Accordingly, the results of the present study are consistent with the two-
factor solution for intuition and analysis and therefore, support the dual process theory.  
 From a practitioner perspective, the findings of the present study provide some 
insight as to when it may be acceptable to give some consideration to the role of intuition 
when making hiring decisions. This study found that when recruiting for a complex job, 
interviewer expertise has a positive impact on intuition. Furthermore, when the 
interviewer is an expert, their intuitive decisions were as good as their analytical 
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decisions. Therefore, perhaps it might be prudent to give some weight to an expert 
interviewer’s intuitive judgment when hiring for complex jobs.  
 On the other hand, this study also found that non-expert interviewers perform 
significantly better when using analysis than intuition. Accordingly, in situations where 
the interviewers are non-experts (e.g., a new manager with no prior hiring experience), it 
seems imperative that they are provided with the necessary training, tools, and processes 
that will allow them to make analytical hiring decisions.        
Limitations 
 As with any research, this study has a number of limitations. First, since intuition 
is a nonconscious process, it is difficult to determine if the participants actually used 
intuition in making their decisions. Although the method and instructions to prompt 
intuitive decision-making was consistent with prior research (Dane et al., 2012; Pretz, 
2008), and the final analysis only included the participants who successfully passed the 
manipulation checks, it is still possible that some participants may not have entirely relied 
on their intuition to make decisions. For instance, based on their responses to the 
manipulation check questions, approximately 1/3 of the participants in the intuition 
condition used analysis more than intuition. Even though they were asked to use intuition 
alone, perhaps the participants were inclined to use their natural (or trained) 
predisposition to be analytical.  
 Second, recall that in each interview scenario, one candidate response was good 
and the other was average. The good-average response format, as opposed to a good-poor 
response format, was used to reduce the contrast between the two candidate responses 
and thereby make the decision to select the best response more complex. However, it is 
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likely that the good-average response format made the decision to select the best response 
too difficult which, in turn, may have affected the results.   
 Third, the dependent variable, accuracy of a hiring decision, was not a predictive 
measure of job performance (i.e., a measure that assesses the actual job performance of 
the interviewees). Recall that the candidate responses were scripted and validated through 
a two-step process using expert samples. Although similar techniques have been used in 
prior research (Maurer, 2002; Maurer & Lee, 2000), this type of validation may not be as 
accurate as using actual interviewees and measuring their success through a subsequent 
evaluation of their job performance.  
Fourth, participants completed the experiment remotely (i.e., on their computers 
at their desks) rather than in a more controlled lab environment. This method was used as 
it induced a natural work environment since the candidate interviews are generally 
conducted at the recruiters’ desks. Furthermore, the method adheres to the call from 
scholars to conduct intuition research related to organizational decision-making in field 
settings (Dane et al., 2012). However, compared to a lab environment, the method used in 
this study does make the participants more susceptible to environmental factors that may 
disrupt their task performance and/or their attention to study details. For example, there 
were notable differences in task completion times among the participants.  
Fifth, with regard to the manipulation to induce procedural accountability, about 
38 percent of the participants failed the manipulation check. This result does bring up a 
concern that participants may not have felt accountable. Since the participants completed 
the experiment remotely with no direct contact with the researcher, perhaps they felt it 
unlikely that would have to justify their decision-making approach to anyone. However, 
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it should be noted that those who failed the manipulation check were not used in the final 
analysis.     
Sixth, half of the items in the Rational-Experiential-Inventory were removed 
during confirmatory factor analysis in order to obtain acceptable model fit. In the final 
model, the items that measured rational (i.e., analytical) and experiential (i.e., intuitive) 
cognitive style were reduced to six and four respectively. There is some evidence that the 
experiential scale may not be entirely unidimensional (Pretz and Totz, 2007) which might 
explain the low factor loadings of many experiential scale items. In addition, having a 
large number of reverse coded items may also have contributed to the issue.   
Finally, the sample size was relatively small which limited statistical power. 
Furthermore, although this study used a sample of real-world decision makers in their 
natural work setting, it is still susceptible to a drawback of most experimental research, 
which is limited generalizability (McGrath, 1981).  
Directions for Future Research 
 The present study was an attempt to advance our knowledge of when intuition can 
be useful to make hiring decisions. In doing so, it also extended our understanding of the 
role of intuition in the broader decision-making arena. The insights gained from this 
study provide numerous opportunities for future research.  
 For instance, this study explored the effect of intuition in an organizational 
decision-making context, specifically employee selection. Due to the difficulties in 
obtaining samples of organizational decision makers, most studies that empirically 
examine the role of intuition has focused on tasks that are not closely related to 
organizational decision-making situations (e.g., Dane et al., 2012; Dijksterhuis, 2004; 
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Pretz, 2008). Therefore, for us to fully understand the effects of intuition for 
organizational problems, more research needs to be conducted in real-world settings. 
With regard to employee selection, this study found intuition to be helpful when the 
interviewer is an expert and the candidate being recruited is a healthcare professional. To 
support the generalizability of this result, it will be insightful to test if these findings hold 
true for expert interviewers in other types of complex job settings such as executive level 
positions. 
 In addition, advances in neuroscience provide an opportunity for intuition to be 
measured through brain activity (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Lieberman, 2000). As 
previously noted, the self-reported evidence of the use of intuition has its limitations in 
being able to truly identify if an unconscious cognitive process such as intuition was 
used. Thus, using neurological techniques to determine the role of intuition, especially in 
organizational decision-making situations, may provide significant insights into the 
impact of intuitive decision-making. 
   With regard to the relationship between cognitive style and its effect on decision 
quality, this study did not find conclusive evidence to support an association. While some 
prior research has found a match between cognitive style and decision strategy to produce 
better outcomes (e.g., Friedman et al., 1985), there is some evidence that a mismatch may 
be more desirable especially when it comes to increasing creativity (Dane et al., 2011). 
Therefore, further research is required to understand when an individual’s cognitive style 
impacts decision quality and when it does not. 
 Finally, even though a negative relationship between procedural accountability 
and expert intuition was hypothesized, it was not supported in the present study. This 
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result might be because the manipulation was not strong enough to induce the level of 
accountability that may make an expert forego their intuition in favor of a decision-
making approach that they could more easily justify. It will be interesting to see if a 
controlled laboratory experiment with a stronger prompt for accountability provides a 
different result. Furthermore, future research should also consider other contextual factors 
that inhibit an expert’s ability to make effective decisions. 
Conclusion 
 Although scholars have been studying intuition for decades, we still have a 
limited understanding of what intuition is, how it works, and when it can be useful. The 
purpose of the present study was to address the latter, which is, to expand our knowledge 
of when intuition may be beneficial in an organizational decision-making environment 
such as employee selection. By using a sample of real-world decision makers in their 
natural setting, the study found that when the interviewer is an expert and the position 
being hired for is complex; intuition is an effective way to make decisions. This finding is 
significant to academic research as it extends our understanding of when intuition can be 
useful to a domain (i.e., employee selection) where scholars have often discounted the 
use of intuition. For practitioners, these findings suggest that, when conditions for 
effective intuitive decision-making are sufficiently met, it may be prudent to give some 
consideration to intuitive judgment.       
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Appendix A 
Table 11 
Interview Questions and Answers 
Job Dimension Interview Question Good Answer Average Answer 
Attention to Detail In most of our 
positions, you often 
have a large patient 
load and you’re in a 
fast-paced 
environment. What 
would you do to 
avoid medical 
errors? 
With each patient, I 
would spend time 
before seeing the 
patient to go through 
their medical 
history. Then, I will 
thoroughly evaluate 
the patient and make 
detailed notes of the 
session. And after 
each session, I will 
review the file to 
make sure I got 
everything right 
before I move on to 
the next patient. 
No matter how fast 
paced the 
environment is, it is 
important to give 
each patient the 
time and attention 
that is required to 
give them proper 
care. I would 
thoroughly evaluate 
their condition and 
follow the correct 
protocol in treating 
the patient. 
 
Attitude A parent of one of 
your underage 
patients comes to 
your office angry 
and falsely accusing 
you of not taking 
proper care of her 
son. How would 
you respond? 
I would remain calm 
and ask her politely 
what is bothering 
her. I will try to 
empathize with her 
situation as much as 
I can and will avoid 
arguing with her. I 
will explain the 
steps I have taken 
with her son to show 
her that I have 
followed the correct 
protocol in taking 
care of her son. 
After she leaves, I 
will write a record 
of her visit and the 
conversation. 
I will invite her into 
my office and ask 
her to have a seat. I 
won’t argue with 
her but I will be 
clear that I have 
done my best for 
her son and assure 
her that I will 
continue to give 
him the best care 
possible. I will give 
her my supervisor’s 
contact information 
and tell her that she 
is welcome to talk 
to my supervisor if 
she has further 
concerns. 
Dependability Let's say you accept 
a position with us 
and two days before 
your start date, one 
I will get another 
family member or a 
friend to help out 
with my sick family 
I will call my 
supervisor and 
explain the situation 
to her. I will let her 
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of your family 
members come 
down with a cold. 
What will you do? 
member so that I 
could report to work 
on my start date. 
know that I will do 
everything I can to 
report to work on 
time. But, in case 
my family 
member's sickness 
doesn't get better, I 
might have to delay 
my start date a little. 
I will take care of 
my family member 
and get to work as 
soon as possible.  
Communication Let's say you are 
phone interviewing 
for a position 
with one of our 
client facilities and 
the manager says 
to you "so, tell me 
why you would be a 
good fit for this 
position?" How 
would you respond? 
I usually prepare for 
an interview by 
writing down key 
points about my 
background that I 
think will be most 
applicable to the 
job. When I'm asked 
that question, I will 
present those points 
so that the manager 
can see how my 
experience meets 
the specific 
requirements of the 
position. 
I always have my 
resume in front of 
me when I'm on a 
phone interview. If 
I'm asked that 
question, I will 
present my 
experience in 
reverse 
chronological order 
so that I can provide 
the manager with a 
thorough 
understanding of 
my skills and 
experience. 
Client Focus While working at 
one of our client 
facilities, a need 
may arise where you 
are asked to take on 
additional 
responsibilities 
beyond your busy 
patient schedule. 
Let’s say your 
supervisor at the 
client facility calls 
you and asks if you 
will be willing to 
train one of 
their new 
employees. What 
I will say yes to my 
supervisor and work 
out my schedule to 
accommodate 
training the new 
employee. I have 
previous experience 
training new 
employees while 
managing a large 
patient load. 
Since I have a busy 
patient schedule, 
taking on this 
responsibility may 
have a negative 
impact on attending 
to my patients. So, I 
will tell my 
supervisor that I 
will be happy to 
train the new 
employee if my 
schedule can be 
adjusted so that I 
have time to do the 
training. 
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will you do? 
Flexibility Assume we made 
you an offer for one 
of our positions. 
How would you 
respond if the 
position meets 
everything you're 
looking for with the 
exception that the 
pay is slightly below 
what you're making 
now? 
If the position meets 
everything else that 
I am looking for and 
if the pay is 
competitive for the 
job location and the 
job responsibilities, 
I will take the 
position even if it’s 
a little less than 
what I’m making 
now. 
I do have financial 
obligations that I 
have to meet so I 
would need to make 
at least what I'm 
making right now. 
Having said that, I 
may take less if it's 
the right 
opportunity. 
Honesty Let's say you're 
interviewing at one 
of our client 
facilities and the 
hiring manager asks 
you if you're able to 
do a critical task. 
This task, if done 
incorrectly, may 
have disastrous 
consequences. 
While you have a 
basic understanding 
of the task and little 
experience with it, 
you do have 
extensive 
experience with 
similar tasks. How 
would you respond? 
 
I will let the 
manager know the 
extent of my 
knowledge and 
experience relating 
to the task. I will let 
him know that I am 
willing to do the 
task but will need 
training. 
I will tell the 
manager about the 
amount of 
experience I have 
with that task. But, I 
am a fast learner 
and since I have 
extensive 
experience with 
similar tasks, I will 
tell the manager that 
I can do the task. 
 
Planning and 
Organization 
You have a large 
patient load so your 
schedule is 
hectic. As you 
know, it is critical 
that appropriate 
forms, such as 
Medicaid 
reimbursement 
forms, are 
completed promptly 
and thoroughly. 
On every 
appointment, I 
allocate a few 
minutes after the 
meeting to review 
the session and 
make notes. Then, 
on Friday 
afternoons, I 
normally block out a 
few hours to 
complete paperwork 
If I have a large 
caseload and a busy 
schedule, I may not 
have time during 
regular work hours 
to complete 
paperwork. So, 
what I usually do is 
complete all the 
paperwork during 
weekends. 
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How would you 
manage that? 
for the entire week. 
My session notes 
help me to make 
sure I'm not missing 
any information. 
Professionalism You discovered an 
error you made in 
treating a patient. It 
was a minor error 
and there is no 
noticeable harm to 
the patient. What 
will you do? 
 
I will report the 
error to my 
supervisor. I will 
also take 
precautions to avoid 
making the same 
error again. 
 
I will contact the 
patient and inform 
her of the mistake. 
Also, I will take the 
necessary steps so 
that I don't make the 
same mistake again. 
Responsiveness During the 
recruiting process 
with our company, I 
may need to contact 
you urgently with 
regard to a 
placement at one of 
our clients. In case 
you're on vacation, 
how will I be able to 
reach you? 
If I need to go on 
vacation, I will give 
you multiple ways 
you can contact me 
before I go. So, you 
will be able to get a 
hold of me quickly 
if you try to reach 
me. 
 
I'll give you my cell 
number before I go 
on vacation. I check 
my messages 
periodically so I 
should be able to 
get back with you 
soon if you try to 
reach me. 
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Sample Interview Scenario as seen by Participants 
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Figure 12 
Sample Interview Scenario as seen by Participants 
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Instructions for the Intuition Condition 
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Appendix C 
Figure 13 
Instructions for the Intuition Condition 
 
 
 
  
Please follow the instructions below when selecting the best response: 
 Select the first choice that comes to your mind 
 Avoid thinking very hard about what the “right” answer is 
 Let your intuition and gut instinct guide you and make the decision 
that feels right to you 
 Your decision should be based on your first impression about the 
candidates 
 Do not try to analyze information or apply additional logic beyond your 
intuitive response 
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Instructions for the Analysis Condition 
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Appendix D 
Figure 14 
Instructions for the Analysis Condition 
 
 
 
  
Please follow the instructions below when selecting the best response: 
 Do not select the first choice that comes to your mind 
 Carefully consider all available information before making a decision 
 You should analyze the options and make your decision in 
a logical and systematic way 
 Ignore any first impression or gut instinct based choices 
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Instructions for the Intuition-Procedural Accountability Condition 
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Appendix E 
Figure 15 
Instructions for the Intuition-Procedural Accountability Condition 
 
 
 
Please note that at the end of the exercise you may be asked to write a 
brief explanation of the process you followed when selecting the best 
response.  
 
Please follow the instructions below when selecting the best response: 
 Select the first choice that comes to your mind 
 Avoid thinking very hard about what the “right” answer is 
 Let your intuition and gut instinct guide you and make the decision 
that feels right to you 
 Your decision should be based on your first impression about the 
candidates 
 Do not try to analyze information or apply additional logic beyond your 
intuitive response 
 
